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Spanish financial
markets and
intermediaries
In recent years, the Banco de España Eco-
nomic Bulletin has been paying increasing at-
tention to Spanish financial markets and inter-
mediaries. Clearly, they have always played a
central role in the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy decisions, both when these de-
cisions were taken by the Banco de España
and now that the Eurosystem determines the
monetary policy for the euro area centrally.
Also, the monitoring of financial markets and in-
termediaries is essential to promote the stability
of the financial system (a function assigned to
the Banco de España by statute) and to identify
the degree of competitiveness of an industry
whose relative weight in the Spanish economy
is growing.
The aim of this article is to give an overview
of the main recent developments in the markets
for financial products and services and of the
behaviour of the main intermediaries acting in
such markets. Given the notable changes in the
Spanish financial system as a consequence of
the start of Stage Three of EMU, and the data
currently available, the analysis focuses on the
first three quarters of 1999.
The article is divided into two parts. Part 1
analyses the developments in financial markets,
distinguishing between fixed-income, equity and
derivative markets. For each market, the analy-
sis focuses on the prices and the main develop-
ments in the primary and secondary markets.
Part 2 analyses the behaviour of the main finan-
cial intermediaries, distinguishing between de-
posit money institutions and other important in-
termediaries, such as mutual funds, pension
funds and insurance companies.
1. THE SPANISH FINANCIAL MARKETS
In 1999, important changes affected the
Spanish money and securities markets. First,
the existence of a single monetary policy in the
euro area and the fixing of the irrevocable ex-
change rates between the euro area currencies
meant that the interbank deposit markets of the
countries making up this area were now fully in-
t e g r a t e d(1) and that the spread of yields on
government debt in the area held at low and
stable levels. Second, since the beginning of
1999, the cash and securities accounts for the
trading, quoting and settlement of transactions
in the Spanish markets have been redenomi-
nated in euro. These changes have coincided
with the entry into force of the reform of the Se-
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(1) In fact, it is no longer possible to speak of a Spanish
money market. The relevant geographical area for this pur-
pose encompasses the countries that make up the euro
area.
curities Market Law (Law 37/1998), which
adapts Spanish law to various Community di-
rectives and completes the process of opening
up Spanish markets to external competition, by
enshrining the principle of the right of establish-
ment and the freedom to provide investment
services in EU countries. These reforms have
helped to increase competition in euro area
markets and have thereby stimulated the trans-
formation of the Spanish markets to adapt to
the new environment. This is the background to
the reforms to the book-entry debt market and
the changes made in the Spanish derivatives
markets, both of which will be analysed below.
In short, all these changes have taken place
within the more general process of increasing
integration of European financial markets, con-
solidating a trend that had already been appar-
ent in the past (see Box 1).
Against this background, the most prominent
developments in relation to the prices of Span-
ish financial assets in 1999 were the halt to de-
clining interest rates in fixed-income markets
and the moderation of the upward trend in equi-
ty prices. As for quantities, the boom in private
fixed-income markets was notable. This was
the extension of a trend that began in 1998,
whereby public-sector issues have been gradu-
ally losing weight in favour of those made by
private companies.
1.1. Fixed-income markets
1.1.1. Yields
In 1999, the decline in yields on public debt
markets, which began in 1995, came to a halt
(see Chart 1). This turning point was first appar-
ent at the medium and long maturities, where
yields began to rise as from February, while
yields on short-term debt continued to trend
downwards until the middle of the year, in step
with the interest rates negotiated in the euro
area interbank deposit market.
The upward movement in long-term yields
was apparently the result, at first, of the pull ex-
erted by US debt prices, which had been falling
since October 1998. The prices of US debt
seem to have been hit initially by the return of
flows which had fled higher-risk assets during
the summer-1998 financial crisis and, later, by
fears that the vigorous growth in the US econo-
my would lead to inflationary pressures and a
tightening of monetary policy. However, given
the different cyclical position of the euro area
countries, some of whose economies showed
signs of economic slowdown at the beginning of
the year, the movements in US debt yields were
not completely passed through to euro area
debt. As a result, the spread between US and
euro area debt widened to 170 basis points in
May 1999 (see Chart 1), the highest level since
1989 if German debt is taken as the bench-
mark.
During the first few months of the year, the
downward path of short-term yields, like that of
interbank-deposit-market rates, was driven ini-
tially by expectations of an easing of monetary
policy in the euro area and subsequently by the
50-basis-point cut in the Eurosystem’s interven-
tion rates in April, amid slowing activity and
risks of deflation in the area.
As from the middle of the year, the rise in
medium and long-term yields tended to
strengthen, with certain indicators beginning to
show increasingly palpable signs of economic
recovery in the Euro area. This time, the rise in
yields was greater than on the US market and,
moreover, tended to extend to the shorter matu-
rities, initially reflecting market expectations of a
future rise in euro area intervention rates. At the
beginning of November the Eurosystem’s ten-
der rate for its main refinancing operations was
raised by 50 basis points.
Yields in November 1999, comparing with
December-1998 levels, had risen by 30 basis
points in the case of three-month operations, by
60 basis points in that of one-year operations
and by 120 basis points in that of 10-year debt
issues. The slope of the zero-coupon yield
curve, measured by the difference between
overnight and 15-year rates had widened to 290
basis points, some 100 basis points up on end-
1998. In fact, this slope had stood at 350 basis
points before the rise in intervention rates in the
euro area at the beginning of November (see
Chart 1).
The movements in Spanish debt yields fol-
lowed a very similar pattern to that set by the
yields on the sovereign debt of the euro area
countries, so that the spreads between the
yields on the debt issued by the various coun-
tries remained quite stable. Thus, for example,
the spread between the yield on Spanish and
German debt at the 10-year maturity fluctuated
slightly around the 25-basis-point level. The low
volatility of such spreads in 1999 is a conse-
quence of the stability of the markets’ assess-
ment of the factors which, now that the currency
of issuance is the same, determine the size of
such spreads. These include the different credit
ratings of the national issuers and the differ-
ences in the liquidity of the issues.
By contrast, the 10-year yield spreads be-
tween the Spanish and US and Spanish and
Japanese debt moved significantly. The spread
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BOX 1
Financial integration between international stock exchanges in the nineties
Financial markets are understood to be perfectly integrated when there are no barriers to transactions between
them, such as taxes, restrictions on the holding of external assets, information costs or any other cost which makes it
more difficult to trade between markets than within them. Where two markets are perfectly integrated, it would be possi-
ble to say that they are in fact one single market. During the eighties and nineties, primarily as a consequence of the lib-
eralisation of capital movements and, later, the improvements in telecommunications, there is thought to have been an
increase in the degree of integration between international financial markets. However, it is likely that they are still not
perfectly integrated since certain barriers, such as taxes and, in some countries, restrictions on the holding of external
assets, persist. 
Measuring the degree of financial integration between two markets is not a simple task since there is no generally
accepted problem-free measure. In the past, the degree of integration between two markets has usually been approxi-
mated by the correlation between the prices of the assets traded on them. However, a higher correlation is not a neces-
sary or sufficient condition for a greater degree of integration. To appreciate this point one need only observe that as-
sets traded on the same market are not perfectly correlated and, on occasions, their correlation is even lower than
those between assets traded on different markets. For example, an average correlation of 0.47 is obtained between the
sectoral indices of the US stock exchange in the second half of the nineties, as against an average correlation of 0.54
between the indices of the main world stock markets (1). This evidence might be mistakenly interpreted as indicating
that the integration between international stock exchanges is greater than the self-integration of the US stock exchange.
Recently, a new way of measuring the degree of integration has been proposed in the literature, based on the law
of one price. This measure estimates the absolute value of the difference between the prices that would be assigned by
two markets to two portfolios each consisting of assets traded on a different market but with identical payoffs. A zero
value of this measure would mean that there were no arbitrage opportunities between them, while a positive value
would indicate the existence of arbitrage opportunities and the absence of perfect integration. The degree of integration
will be greater the lower the value of the measure.
In a recent Research Department study (2), the above measure of integration, with some refinements, is applied to
three pairs of stock markets (Madrid, New York and Frankfurt) in order to assess whether there has been an increase in
the degree of integration between them during the nineties. The application of this measure runs up against certain
practical problems that are overcome in this study by the use of two alternative approaches. In both approaches the
measure of integration between pairs of markets is computed by considering different sub-market combinations (each
made up of a certain number of securities listed on the same market). To facilitate interpretation of the results measures
of relative integration are defined, based on the difference between measures of integration between different markets
and those obtained for the same market (3).
The adjoining table shows the average value of the estimates of the relative measures of the degree of integration
for each of the three pairs of markets studied, distinguishing between the first and second halves of the nineties (4).
Three characteristics can be seen in this table: i) the measures are all positive, which suggests that the market included
in the study are not perfectly integrated; ii) the value of the measure fell in every case in the second half of the nineties,
which could be interpreted as indicating an increase in the degree of financial integration; and iii) comparison of the
countries considered suggests that the integration is greatest, in both the time periods considered, between the Spanish
and German markets, while the lowest degree of integration is between the Spanish and US markets.
These results have important implications. For example, owing to the reduction in barriers to transactions between
markets, greater integration means improvements in ef-
ficiency and in the combinations of risk and return avail-
able to investors. This can be seen as a counter-argu-
ment to those who hold that financial markets are now
too vulnerable owing to the greater interaction between
them. Another consequence of greater integration be-
tween markets is the reduced scope for the successful
pursuit of exclusively domestically focused economic
policies.
Measures of relative integration between stock
xchanges. Averages in basis points (the lower the
value the higher the degree of integration)
Benchmark market= New York
New York-Frankfurt 12.0 7.0
New York-Madrid 19.1 8.8
Benchmark market = Madrid
Madrid-Frankfurt 10.7 5.0
Madrid-New York 17.4 7.4
This table shows the averages of the relative integration
measures obtained from 10,000 different estimates, based on
the same number of combinations of sub-markets each made
up of 10 randomly selected assets from each market. In the
first two rows the market taken as benchmark to obtain the rel-
ative measures is New York, while in the second two rows it is
Madrid.
1990-1994 1995-1999
(1) See Ayuso and Blanco: “Has financial market in-
tegration increased during the nineties?”, Banco de Es-
paña Working Paper 9923.
(2) Ayuso and Blanco: “Has financial market integra-
tion increased during the nineties?”, Banco de España
Working Paper 9923.
( 3 ) Although, in theory, the measure of self-integra-
tion of a market is zero, problems of estimation may
mean that in practice a positive value is obtained.
(4) These results are based on the second approach
considered. The results obtained using the first ap-
proach are qualitatively the same.
between US and Spanish debt, as mentioned
above, widened until May, subsequently nar-
rowed to around end-1998 levels in October
and widened again slightly in November. It is
notable that the volatility of this spread was sig-
nificantly lower in 1999 than previously, al-
though similar to the historical volatility dis-
played by the spread between US and German
debt. Meanwhile, the spread between the yields
on Spanish and Japanese debt was highly
volatile. It fell sharply in January, when is-
suance by the Japanese government was at
very high levels. Subsequently, it recovered to
the end-1998 level in March, and thereafter
continued to widen to reach 350 basis points in
November. In short, the above evidence does
not conclusively show that the introduction of
the euro has led to an increase in the impor-
tance of idiosyncratic factors in price formation
on international debt markets (a view held by
certain authors). Although the volatility of the
spread between euro area and Japanese debt
has increased, the volatility of the spread be-
tween German and US debt has not changed
significantly.
As regards the yields on assets issued by
private Spanish companies, the available infor-
mation suggests that the spreads over govern-
ment debt narrowed in 1999. This would be
consistent with the developments in other inter-
national debt markets, such as the US market
where, after a widening of spreads during the
1998 financial crisis, they have since returned
to around pre-crisis levels. None the less, in the
Spanish case this result must be treated with
caution because, with the information available,
which groups all the issues traded by maturity,
it is not possible to control for the issuer’s credit
rating (2).
1.1.2. Primary markets
As regards issuance volumes in Spanish
fixed-income primary markets, the trends al-
ready seen in 1998 became much more pro-
nounced in 1999 (see Table 1). General gov-
ernment issuance continued to decline, while
the upward trend in the issuance of other resi-
dent sectors firmed to the point that, in net
terms, their volume of issuance in the period
January to September 1999 was more than
double that of general government. These de-
velopments, as discussed below, are explained
by a number of different factors. Notable among
these are the smaller government borrowing re-
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CHART 1
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for all the issues traded, distinguishing between certain ma-
turities.
quirement, the inclusion of certain fixed-income
securities issued by private firms in the lists of
eligible collateral for ESCB monetary policy op-
erations and the new tax treatment applicable
to this type of issue.
General government net issuance was posi-
tive again in the first three quarters of 1999,
having been negative in the final quarter of
1998 due to the high level of redemptions in
that period. However, the volume of net is-
suance was only just over half the level in the
same period of 1998. Issuance by the main is-
suer (the State) continued to be concentrated in
the medium and long maturities, so that net
Treasury bill issuance was still negative during
the first three quarters of 1999. In conse-
quence, the average life of State debt rose from
5 to 5.3 years between end-1998 and Septem-
ber 1999. Territorial government issuance re-
mained moderate in 1999, although the net
amounts were higher than in the same period of
the previous year. The largest net volumes
were in medium and long-term instruments.
As regards issuers other than general gov-
ernment, unlike in 1998, the 1999 boom in the
market is not only explained by the buoyancy of
securitisation, but also by the fact that growth
extended to other issuers and other instru-
ments.
Net issuance by credit institutions in the first
three quarters of 1999 was almost three-times
as high as in the same period of 1998. The
rapid growth in the issuance of this sector partly
reflects greater net borrowing as a result of the
expansion of credit without an equivalent ex-
pansion of customer funds (see Part 2 of this
article for a more detailed analysis). The is-
suance volume of other resident sectors held at
a historically high level, although in both the first
two quarters of 1999 the net amount was lower
than in the final quarter of 1998. Securitisation
operations continued to account for a very sig-
nificant part of the volumes issued by these
sectors.
By maturity, the most active segment of pri-
vate-sector issuance was that of medium- and
long-term operations. Notwithstanding this, the
growth of short-term operations (commercial
paper) was notable, boosted by the more ad-
vantageous tax treatment for legal persons, fol-
lowing the elimination, as from the beginning of
1999, of withholdings on their returns. This
measure, which has been applied to all book-
entry fixed-income securities traded on organ-
ised markets, has entailed, in the case of com-
mercial paper, the elimination of withholdings
on all transactions. The impact of the change in
tax treatment on medium- and long-term debt
has been less significant in so far as only
coupon payments were previously subject to
withholdings (see Box 2).
The effect of all these developments has
been a continuation of the rise in the weight of
the outstanding securities issued by resident
companies in all domestic fixed-income issues.
This weight reached 19.5 % at the end of the
third quarter of 1999, 3.9 percentage points
higher than at end-1998 (see Chart 2). As men-
tioned above, this is explained by a combination
of several kinds of factor, most of which were
already active in 1998. On the supply side, the
reduction in the public deficit has reduced the
State borrowing requirement leaving room for
the issues of other sectors. At the same time,
various regulatory changes introduced in 1998
have facilitated the issuance of fixed-income
securities by private sectors by increasing the
flexibility and simplifying and lowering the cost
of the issuance process and by widening the
range of instruments available. In particular, the
introduction of the programme prospectus en-
ables more than one issue to be made without
a full prospectus being required for each, and
the admission prospectus(3) has been elimi-
nated. In addition, the extension of the regula-
ion of securitisation(4) has introduced greater
flexibility into securitisation operations and has
widened the range of securitisable assets.
On the demand side, the inclusion of certain
fixed-income securities issued by private firms
in the lists of eligible collateral for ESCB mone-
tary policy operations has boosted the demand
for this type of security from credit institutions.
Also, the new tax treatment applicable to the
fixed-income issues of private firms (which, as
mentioned above, exempts legal persons from
withholdings on the returns obtained and brings
their tax treatment into line with that of State
debt) has stimulated the demand for these in-
struments. Finally, the greater stability of the
Spanish economy and the lower nominal yield
on lower-risk assets is another factor helping to
stimulate a shift of investment from assets is-
sued by the State towards others with a higher
expected return and, in consequence, a greater
risk, such as fixed-income securities issued by
private firms.
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( 3 ) These measures were introduced in Royal Decree
2590/1998 on changes to the legal regime for the securities
market, known as the “Omnibus Royal Decree”. For further
information see “Financial regulation: fourth quarter of
1998”, in Economic bulletin, Banco de España, January
1999.
(4) Royal Decree 926/1998 of 14 May. For further infor-
mation see “Financial regulation: second quarter of 1998”,
in Economic bulletin, Banco de España, July 1998
All of these trends will foreseeably intensify
in the future. The Stability and Growth Pact will
lay the foundations for a reduction in the weight
of public debt in the financial markets. At the
same time, the low weight of securitisation in
Spain in comparison with more developed mar-
kets, like those in the US and Germany, por-
tends further expansion of fixed-income instru-
ments associated with securitisation operations,
in an environment in which economic stability
will continue to help steer investors towards
higher risk assets. In this context, the agree-
ment between AIAF (Association of Securities
Dealers), the stock exchanges and the SCLV
(Securities Clearing and Settlement Service) to
harmonise the settlement procedures for the
fixed-income securities traded on these markets
will help to increase the attractiveness of private
fixed-income instruments in so far as the costs
of secondary market trading will be lower.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the grow-
ing weight of assets issued by the private sector
is a general trend that is also discernible in oth-
er international markets. After all, a large num-
ber of the explanatory factors mentioned above
(such as the shift in demand towards higher risk
assets and the decline in the State borrowing
requirement) are also relevant at the interna-
tional level. Besides these factors, the available
evidence suggests that emerging market is-
suers have increased their recourse to debt fi-
nancing on international markets, after their
withdrawal following the international financial
crisis in 1998.
The available information on world-wide debt
ssues reveals a high level of activity in these
markets in 1999. In the first half of the year the
net volume was 30 % higher than in the same
period of 1998 and well above the quarterly vol-
umes recorded in recent years. As in the Span-
ish market, the buoyancy of world debt markets
in 1999 was essentially due to the behaviour of
the private sector. The information available for
the third quarter, relating solely to the interna-
tional segment (placements outside the issuer’s
country, generally made simultaneously in sev-
eral countries), confirms that the world primary
debt markets remained buoyant.
With regard to the nationality of the issuers,
the growth in the volume of net issuance has
been very much across-the-board, although it
has been particularly strong in the case of euro
area issuers. In the first quarter of 1999 the
weight of these issuers in total net issuance
was 24 %, a higher proportion than in previous
quarters. Nonetheless, US issuers continued to
account for the largest proportion of new issues
during the same period, with 46 % of the total.
By currency, the relative growth in euro is-
suance is notable. During the first half of the
year the amount of net issuance in that curren-
cy represented 25 % of the total. This was high-
er than the recent historical average weight of
net issuance in the currencies replaced by the
euro (around 16 %). The growth in the weight of
euro issuance has also been more apparent in
the international segment, where the proportion
of net issuance in that currency was 43 % in the
first half of 1999 (only 6 percentage points be-
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TABLE 1
Net issuance of fixed-income securities (a)
EUR millions
General government 13,635 7,922 -8,571 5,230 2,407 285
State 12,484 6,336 -9,607 4,011 2,348 -23
Short-term -11,846 -11,018 -2,122 -7,277 -1,382 -2,359
Medium- and long-term 24,330 17,354 -7,485 11,289 3,730 2,336
Territorial government 1,151 1,586 1,036 1,219 59 308
Short-term 62 107 172 144 43 -81
Medium- and long-term 1,089 1,479 865 1,075 16 388
Credit institutions 3,753 11,198 -58 4,865 2,789 3,544
Short-term 14 6,690 -25 2,103 1,205 3,382
Medium- and long-term 3,739 4,508 -33 2,761 1,584 162
Other resident sectors 2,885 7,352 2,884 2,398 1,041 3,914
Short-term 328 699 72 680 -269 288
Medium- and long-term 2,557 6,653 2,812 1,718 1,309 3,626
Fuente: Banco de España.
(a) Including issues of residents denominated in both domestic and foreign currencies.
1998
Q1-Q3
1999
Q1-Q3
1998
Q4 Q1
1999
Q2 Q3
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BOX 2
The new tax treatment for financial assets in 1999
New income tax provisions for residents and non-residents and new regulations on withholdings (1) have, since January 1999,
transformed the tax treatment and system of withholdings for financial assets held by residents and, to a lesser extent, by non-residents.
Owing to the magnitude of these changes and their implications for domestic financial flows and, to a greater extent, for the development
of certain Spanish securities markets, this box focuses on the changes in tax regulations and their effects on resident individual (natural
person) and institutional (legal person) investors.
As regards tax treatment, the most notable changes can be summarised in three points. First, the taxation of a number of financial
assets previously with different tax treatments has been standardised. As from 1999, returns on most financial assets, excluding mutual
funds and shares, are taxed as income from capital irrespective of the taxable event concerned (transfer, redemption or payment of in-
terest). As a result, returns on financial assets that were previously taxed as income from capital and capital gains are now taxed exclu-
sively as income from capital.
Second, the distinction between regular and irregular income has been dispensed with, so that the average rates for the taxation of
unearned income have been abolished, and all unearned income is taxed at the marginal tax rate. Also, the inflation-adjustment coeffi-
cients have disappeared.
Third, a number of reliefs have been established in the taxation of income from capital, ranging from 30 % to 70 % depending on the
investment period and the type of asset concerned. In general, a 30 % relief is applied to income from capital if the investment period ex-
ceeds two years. In the specific case of life-assurance contracts the exemption is 60 % if the investment period exceeds five years and
70 % if it exceeds eight. The recent interpretation given by the tax authorities to unit-linked (2), whereby they are considered to be life
assurance linked to mutual funds, has eliminated many of the uncertainties surrounding the taxation of such assets.
As regards the system of withholdings of personal income tax and corporate income tax the main changes for financial assets can
be summarised as follows. First, a 20 % withholding is introduced for all capital gains made on shares in portfolio investment institutions
although the calculation must take into account any applicable adjustment coefficients. Also, withholdings on income from capital are re-
duced for borrowed funds (basically debt instruments and bank deposits) from 25 % to 18 %. Likewise, it is provided (in the law accom-
panying the 2000 budget) that as from the year 2000 the withholding on dividends will be reduced from 25 % to 18 %. At the same time,
income arising from marketable book-entry fixed-income securities traded on official Spanish secondary securities markets and issued
after the entry into force of the Royal Decree shall be exempt from withholdings of corporate income tax (mainly institutional investors).
This means, for institutional investors, that the systems of withholdings for public and private debt and for Treasury bills and commercial
paper have been standardised.
Furthermore, Income obtained upon the transfer of coupon-paying financial assets (mostly coupon bonds) that fulfil the same condi-
tions as established for corporate income tax, i.e. newly issued marketable book-entry fixed-income securities, is exempt from withhold-
ings of personal income tax. Also, although the general 25 % withholding is maintained, it is confirmed that a 25 % withholding shall be
applied to income from life-assurance contracts (note that prior to 1999 there existed life-assurance contracts which generated capital
gains and were thus exempt from withholdings). Finally, the obligation to make payments on account of income paid with a frequency of
less than once a year has been abolished.
These changes to taxation and the system of withholdings have important implications for the development of the Spanish financial
markets. First, the standardisation of the taxation of public and private fixed-income assets has given a considerable boost to the trading
and issuance of private securities. This expansion has been proportionately greater in the case of short-term securities (commercial pa-
per) than in that of long-term securities (bonds). Second, they have boosted the development of bank time deposits, in particular those at
more than two years. With the 30 % relief on the income, the post-tax return has improved for medium-and low-income investors. In-
deed, financial innovation is generating banking products linked to indices and other references, enabling investors to obtain a premium
over guaranteed interest rates.
Furthermore, the new system of withholdings is a disincentive to the growth of mutual funds, especially money-market funds (FI-
AMMs). In addition to their low financial return due to the low interest rates on money markets, there is now the tax cost arising from the
20 % withholding on account. Finally, there has been a further expansion in the marketing of unit-linked by banks, savings banks and in-
surance companies. In practice these instruments enable investors to invest in mutual funds, with the advantage of being able to switch
between funds without any tax implications, and also to pay less tax in the medium and long term.
(1) Law 40/1998 of 9 December 1998 and Royal Decree 214/1999 of 5 February 1999; Law 41/1998 of 9 December 1998 and Royal Decree 326/1999 of 26
February 1999 and Royal Decree 2717/1998 of 18 December 1998, respectively.
(2) “Unit-linked” are hybrid financial assets since, although they have the legal form of life assurance, in practice the policy-holder (the investor) can choose
between various funds or baskets of funds for his investment and can even change this choice on successive occasions.
Main changes to the taxation of financial assets
BANK DEPOSITS Discount instruments Interest IFC IFC
(at less than 2 years)
Discount instrument Interest IFC IFC+
(at more than 2 years)
GOVERNMENT SECURITIES) Discount instruments Transfer and redemption IFC IFC+
(Fixed-income only) (Treasury bills)
Coupon-paying instrumentsInterest IFC IFC+
(State bonds) Transfer and redemption CNW IFC+
PRIVATE FIXED- Discount instruments) Transfer and redemption IFC IFC+
INCOME SECURITIES (commercial paper)
Coupon-paying instrumentsInterest IFC IFC+
(private bonds) Transfer and redemption CNW IFC+
EQUITIES Shares Dividends IFC IFC+
Transfer and redemption CNW+IAC+exemptions CGL
MUTUAL FUNDS Mutual-fund shares Dividends IFC IFC+
Transfer and redemption CNW+IAC+exemptions CGL
INSURANCE CONTRACTS Life assurance and unit Income type IFC IFC+reliefs
linked Capital type CNW+IAC+exemptions IFC++
IFC: Income from capital.
CGL: Capital gains and losses. Analogous to changes in net-worth (CNW), i.e. increases and decreases in net-worth.
IFC+: There is relief on 30 % of IFC from instruments at more than 2 years.
IFC++: In addition to IFC+, for life-assurance held for over 5 and over 8 years there are reliefs on 60 % and 70 % of the return.
IAC: Inflation-adjustment coefficients.
Type of instrument Classification for tax purposes Taxable event
Type of income
1991 & 1996 Laws 1998 Law
hind the dollar), as against 34 % in 1998 and
24.6 % in 1997.
1.1.3. Secondary markets
Trading volumes on Spanish secondary debt
markets have continued to grow in most mar-
kets and segments, although with appreciable
differences from market to market, partly re-
flecting the different developments in the vari-
ous primary markets (see Table 2).
In the book-entry public-debt market there
was moderate growth in trading. In spot trans-
actions the overall growth of volumes was par-
ticularly strong in the non-market-member seg-
ment. As regards instruments, spot bond trans-
actions accounted for a growing proportion of
activity while, in line with primary markets, vol-
umes of bill transactions fell in relation to 1998.
These developments in activity on the pub-
lic-debt market occurred amid structural
changes in the market. The rights and obliga-
tions of market makers have been extended
and, for the first time, non-resident entities are
permitted to enjoy this status. These measures
aim to increase market liquidity by increasing
the extent of market makers’ obligations to
quote bid and ask prices. Also in 1999, the four
screens of the “blind-broker” system were
merged into one single screen to which traders
have access. In short, these reforms will help to
increase the attractiveness of Spanish public
debt by making the market more liquid.
In the AIAF (Asociación de Intermediarios de
Activos Financieros; Association of Securities
Dealers) market, the rise in trading volumes in
the fourth quarter of 1998 was consolidated in
1999. In the first three quarters volumes were
three times higher than in the same period of
1998. Mortgage certificate and bond transac-
tions continued to account for most of the activ-
ity in the market thanks to the buoyancy of se-
curitisation-bond transactions, whose volumes
represented around half of all trading on the
AIAF market. The increase in activity in this
segment is basically explained by the growth in
repurchase agreements directly and indirectly
related to the counterparties’ operations to ob-
tain liquidity for Eurosystem tenders. Such op-
erations have been performed since the fourth
quarter of 1998, when certain assets traded on
this market became acceptable as collateral for
monetary-policy tenders. In addition, since Oc-
tober 1998, the segment has had the benefit of
the resolution of the Council of the National Se-
curities Market Commission (CNMV) which
made it possible for a new instrument – prefer-
ence shares – to be listed on the AIAF market.
This is a hybrid fixed-income/equity instrument
usually issued by subsidiaries of Spanish credit
institutions located abroad.
Activity has also been strongly expansionary
in the notes segment. This has been a conse-
quence, given the importance of operations to
e-place issued securities, of the buoyancy of
the primary market and also of the more
favourable tax treatment applicable to sec-
ondary-market transactions in these instru-
ments.
By contrast, matador-bond trading volumes
have fallen as a consequence of the reduction
in the outstanding stock of securities, a result of
issuers’ loss of interest in this market following
the disappearance of its main distinguishing el-
ement as a consequence of monetary unifica-
tion.
Unlike in other markets, there was a decline
in total fixed-income trading volumes on stock
markets. This is attributable to the decline in the
segment in which most of the activity of this
market is concentrated (that of transactions in
t rritorial-government securities). By contrast,
the trading volume for assets issued by private
firms increased significantly in relation to 1998.
As a consequence of the developments in
primary and secondary markets there have
been certain changes in the distribution by type
f holder of fixed-income assets issued in
Spanish markets. As regards public debt, the
most notable aspect has been the increase in
the holdings of non-resident investors. As at
end-September 1999 they held 25 % of State
debt outright, four-and-a-half percentage points
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more than at end-1998. There is no information
on the distribution of private debt by holder.
However, the information available on the
placement of fixed-income issues registered
with the CNMV also shows an increase in the
holdings of non-residents in 1999. These in-
vestors increased their holdings from 10 % in
1998 as a whole to 19 % in 1999.
1.2. Equity markets
1.2.1. Price developments
After the high revaluations since 1995,
Spanish equity prices in 1999 were charac-
terised until October by the absence of any def-
inite general trend. The Ibex-35 index then
stood at around the end-1998 level (see Chart
3) However, as from the beginning of Novem-
ber, there was a clear upward trend, basically
led by the telecommunications sector, which
took the gain from end-1998 to end-November
to 11.4 %.
Price developments in 1999 were the result
of a number of opposing factors. Among those
with positive effects were the signs of improve-
ment in the international economic environ-
ment, visible since the beginning of the year
and, later on, the prospects for recovery in the
euro area. This change of scenario has had a
positive impact on the earnings forecasts of list-
ed companies and, particularly, on those whose
profit and loss accounts are most closely linked
to the business cycle. This scenario was also
supported by the publication of earnings figures
that were generally more favourable than initial-
ly forecast.
On the other hand, the increase in market in-
terest rates, especially long-term rates, has had
a negative impact on stock prices through two
channels. First, higher interest rates make equi-
ties less attractive relative to fixed income and,
second, they have a negative impact on the fu-
ture earnings of indebted companies by raising
their financial costs.
Across firms price movements were very dif-
ferent, reflecting differences in the markets’ as-
sessment of the prospects of the sectors to
which they belong. Among the sectoral indices
of the Madrid stock exchange, the largest rises
were in the communications index (up 58 % in
he period January-November 1999), mainly at-
tributable to the price of Telefónica which, like
that of most other European firms in this sector,
soared amid good prospects for the growth of
the telecommunications business in the next
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TABLE 2
Trading volumes on secondary fixed-income markets
EUR millions
Book-entry public
debt market 10,975,396 11,085,283 3,138,358 3,319,309 3,446,815 4,319,159
Spot transactions 1,811,700 1,881,240 511,017 647,331 711,981 521,928
State 1,804,540 1,876,223 506,614 645,349 710,113 520,761
Bills 74,535 64,369 25,733 22,792 18,211 23,367
Bonds 1,730,005 1,811,854 480,881 622,557 691,903 497,394
Territorial government 7,160 5,017 4,403 1,982 1,868 1,166
Forward transactions 19,397 18,207 6,434 7,914 5,991 4,303
State 18,911 17,886 5,777 7,720 5,916 4,251
Territorial government 486 321 657 194 75 52
Repos 9,144,299 9,185,836 2,620,907 2,664,065 2,728,843 3,792,929
State 9,094,942 9,141,275 2,605,111 2,652,753 2,710,737 3,777,785
Territorial government 49,357 44,561 15,796 11,312 18,105 15,144
AIAF market 19,572 60,435 23,548 18,915 17,200 24,319
Commercial paper 5,282 14,916 2,652 2,865 3,565 8,486
Bonds and mortgage certificates 9,407 43,518 19,354 15,423 12,615 15,480
Matador bonds 4,883 2,001 1,542 627 1,020 353
Stock market 40,043 32,451 13,105 10,574 11,114 10,763
State 490 142 113 100 33 8
Territorial government 39,002 30,840 12,789 9,947 10,526 10,367
Other 551 1,470 203 527 554 388
Sources: AIAF, Spanish stock exchanges and Banco de España.
1998
Q1-Q3
1999
Q1-Q3
1998
Q4 Q1
1999
Q2 Q3
few years. Another sector whose index rose no-
tably was oil (up 23.6 %), where firms benefited
from rising crude prices. The banking sector,
with a high weight in Spanish stock markets,
also performed better than the general index,
although the gains were relatively moderate
(15.3 %).
The share prices of firms in the electricity
sector fell due to the reduction in tariffs and also
due to the increase in interest rates, since these
firms have high levels of debt (the electricity in-
dex of the Madrid stock exchange fell by
10.8%). Finally, there were also notable falls in
the share prices of firms in the construction and
food sectors (–27.3 % in the construction sector
index and –18.2 % in that of the food sector).
Spanish indices did not perform as well as
those of the main international stock exchanges
(see Chart 3). Of these, the best performing
was the Tokyo exchange’s Nikkei 225, which
from end-1998 to end-November 1999 rose by
34 %. Prices in this market were boosted by the
improvement in the prospects for economic re-
covery in Japan, starting from a very depressed
situation. The S&P 500 US stock market index
rose 13 % over the same period, amid continu-
ation of the current expansion of the US econo-
my at a higher rate than initially forecast. How-
ever, the increases in US interest rates and
fears of further rises in future moderated the up-
ward trend to some extent. Finally, the broad
Dow Jones Euro Stoxx index of euro area stock
markets rose by 21.7 %, led by firms in the
technology and industrial sectors. In fact, the
lower relative weight of this type of firm in the
Spanish market indices would partly explain the
lower rises in Spanish stock markets. At the
same time, the revaluation of technology-sector
firms, which has also occurred in the US mar-
ket, has been notable for its size and for the
fact that many of these firms are loss-making,
giving rise to doubts as to its sustainability. In
Spain, the most striking example has been that
of Terra, a subsidiary of Telefónica. Its share
price almost quadrupled in less than one month
following the IPO in November. In fact, the valu-
ations of these shares suggest that the markets
are discounting the existence of high potential
profits in the future. Some of these firms will
probably never make these profits, especially if
certain areas of business, such as the Internet,
end up dominated by a few firms. Accordingly,
investment in this type of asset involves a very
high element of risk.
Another notable aspect of developments in
Spanish stock exchange indices was their rela-
tively low volatility during most of 1999, espe-
cially when compared with developments during
the financial crisis in the previous year. The
main exception to this stability was in the mid-
le of January, at the time of the announcement
of the widening of the Brazilian real’s fluctuation
bands against the US dollar.
1.2.2. Primary markets
The supply of equities increased notably
during the first three-quarters of 1999, both
through capital increases and IPOs (see Table
3). This development was stimulated by the in-
creasing tendency for agents to invest in this
kind of security. Given the lower nominal re-
turns on lower-risk assets, agents are tending
to shift their investments towards assets with
higher expected returns and, consequently, a
greater risk.
Capital increases were at historically high
levels in the first three quarters of 1999, even
exceeding the exceptionally high volumes dur-
ing the same period of 1998. Non-financial firms
raised a large amount of finance in this way,
with Repsol’s capital increase in July to finance
the purchase of the Argentine firm YPF being
especially notable.
Capital increases in 1999 had the benefit of
a more flexible regulatory framework(5), which
facilitates and simplifies such operations. As
mentioned above, the new regulations have
made the issuance formalities less stringent by
abolishing the admission prospectus. Further-
more, the new regulations have made it possi-
ble to register increases in capital before they
are actually carried out and they facilitate and
envisage the issuance of several types of
shares, including callable and non-voting
shares, shares paying preferential dividends
and preference shares. However, as yet no firm
has used any of these instruments.
In the first three quarters of 1999, the
amount of public offerings was below the level
in the same period of the previous year (see
Table 3), this being attributable to the decline in
the number of privatisations. Unlike in previous
years, in 1999 the bulk of these operations did
not involve the privatisation of state-owned
firms, but rather IPOs. Some of these opera-
tions had been scheduled for the second half of
1998, but on account of the international finan-
cial crisis were postponed until the first half of
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( 5 ) The Omnibus Royal Decree and Law 37/1998, re-
forming the securities market law introduce certain changes
in the commercial regulation and financial supervision tend-
ing to simplify the issuance of securities. In addition, the
Law accompanying the budget completed some of these
changes.
1999, including notably those of Ferrovial,
Mecalux, Azkar and Parques Reunidos. These
operations were generally favourably received
by Spanish investors, who have displayed an
increasing tendency to invest in equities. IPOs
continued in the fourth quarter. That of the Tele-
fónica subsidiary Terra was notable, with pur-
chase orders far in excess of supply and (as
mentioned above) very large price rises in the
initial trading sessions.
1.2.3. Secondary markets
Trading volumes on the Spanish secondary
equity markets continued to grow in 1999 (see
Chart 4), although at more moderate rates than
in recent years. Moreover, part of the growth in
activity in 1999 was attributable to certain ex-
ceptional operations, relating to the exchange
of shareholdings between the former Banco de
Santander and Banco Central Hispano, which
were carried out in the second quarter of 1999
off market.
Security loan transactions continued to grow
in importance in 1999. At end-September the
outstanding amount of such transactions stood
at EUR 8.5 billion, 11.4 % higher than at end-
1998.
The size and activity of Spanish stock mar-
kets is shortly to be increased thanks to the re-
cently created market for Latin American firms.
This Madrid stock exchange initiative means
that certain firms from Latin American countries
can be traded through the Spanish stock mar-
ket electronic trading system, with settlement
through the SCLV.
Finally, as regards the distribution of equities
by holder, as in the case of fixed-income mar-
kets, in 1999 an increase in the holdings of non-
resident investors was discernible. On informa-
tion to July, the net investment by these in-
vestors in the primary and secondary equity
markets remained positive in 1999, although at
a lower level than in the same period of the pre-
vious year. The weight of the activity of these
investors in the secondary market increased
slightly in the same period, rising from 40 % to
44 %. In addition, the information on the place-
ment of the issues and public offerings regis-
tered with the CNMV in the first four months of
1999 shows a significant increase in the propor-
tion placed with non-residents compared with
the information for the whole of 1998 (up from
32 % to 55 %). This has been mainly at the ex-
pense of the household sector. The smaller
number of public offerings in 1999, which usual-
ly attract large numbers of small investors,
could be one of the main factors behind this de-
velopment.
1.3. Derivatives markets
The derivatives markets, especially the
fixed-income segment, have seen the most
rapid transformation following the introduction
of the Euro. The integration of euro area money
markets and the elimination of exchange risk
have entailed an increase in competition be-
tween European derivatives markets, as the
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substitutability of the products linked to the
fixed-income instruments traded in these mar-
kets has increased substantially. The markets
have reacted to this situation by establishing al-
liances and in certain cases by making changes
to their operating structure. In 1998, the Ger-
man DTB derivatives market joined up with the
Swiss SOFFEX market to form the EUREX
market. Subsequently, the Spanish, French,
Portuguese and Italian markets formed an al-
liance called Euro-Globex, the European part of
Globex, the global network of futures ex-
changes which also includes the US CME mar-
ket. The British LIFFE market decided to re-
place “open-outcry” trading by an electronic
system like the one used in the continental mar-
kets. More recently, the Council of MEFF
(Spanish Financial Futures and Options Market)
has resolved to integrate the management of
the companies MEFF Renta Fija and MEFF
Renta Variable.
In markets trading in equity-based instru-
ments the competition has focused on the
launch of new contracts based on aggregate in-
dices for the euro area and other European
countries.
The agreement between the markets inte-
grated in Euro-Globex came into effect at the
beginning of 1999 for contracts on interbank in-
terest rates. Under the agreement the Spanish
MEFF RF market was interconnected with the
French MATIF market and MEFF RF members
were given access to trading in the 3-month Eu-
ribor futures contract, the order book for which
is run by MATIF. MEFF RF members continue
to settle their transactions through MEFF RF,
while their net positions are settled in an ac-
count opened with MATIF by a securities-dealer
company, MEFF Euro Services, formed for the
purpose.
In the middle of the year the agreement was
extended to other MATIF products (bon notion-
nel) and to equity products (pan-European-in-
dex futures), although in the latter case the par-
ties to the agreement were MEFF RV and the
French market MONEP. From the end of the
summer MATIF members have had access to
trading in the MEFF RF-notional-bond futures
contract.
As regards trading volumes, in 1999 there
was a very sharp fall in transactions involving
MEFF RF-listed contracts (see Table 4). The
explanation for this lies, first, in the fact that
market members’ activity in three-month Euri-
bor futures carried out through Euro-Globex is
not recorded by MEFF RF but by MATIF. How-
ever, the cumulative volume of MEFF RF and
MATIF interbank-rate futures contracts contin-
ued to decline in the period January-September
1999 in relation to the same period of the previ-
ous year. The decline in activity in MEFF RF-
listed contracts is also attributable to the shift in
bond-contract transactions to the Eurex market
(see Chart 5). This market has rapidly absorbed
the bulk of trading in derivatives on euro area
government bonds. MEFF RF reacted to this
situation by launching a new contract with an
underlying asset made up of a basket of bonds
issued by several euro area governments. How-
ever, as trading in this new contract did not
reach significant volumes MEFF RF’s strategy
is now focused on marketing products listed on
other markets instead of launching its own
products. This is the background to the recent
agreement between MEFF RF and Eurex
whereby MEFF RF members have access
through their screens to trading in the Eurex
public-debt contract.
Recent developments in activity in European
derivatives markets therefore show the growing
concentration of transactions in euro-interest-
rate contracts in a single market (see Chart 5).
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TABLE 3
Capital increases and public offerings
EUR millions
Capital increases 8,835 9,765 616 1,141 1,327 7,297
Credit institutions 4,839 838 36 128 112 598
Other sectors 3,996 8,927 579 1,013 1,215 6,699
Public offerings 11169 3,377 71 601 1,985 791
Privatisations 10,857 772 0 393 0 379
Other 312 2,605 71 207 1,985 412
Sources: Sociedad de Bolsas and Banco de España.
1998
Q1-Q3
1999
Q1-Q3
1998
Q4 Q1
1999
Q2 Q3
In the case of interbank-rate contracts this mar-
ket is the British LIFFE market, while activity in
contracts linked to medium- and long-term rates
is concentrated in the Eurex market.
As regards activity in equity-based contracts,
MEFF RV trading volumes have been more sta-
ble. In the first quarter activity grew, but in the
second and third quarters the amount traded
slowed. As a consequence, the total trading vol-
ume in the first three quarters of 1999 was 3.6
% higher than in the same period of 1998. In
terms of instruments, the weight of Ibex-35 fu
tures in total trading rose due to a fall in the
trading volumes of options contracts on the
same index. By contrast, the volumes of trans-
actions in options on individual securities grew
in relation to the previous year, although their
relative weight in total trading remains very low.
2. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
During the first three quarters of 1999, Span-
ish financial intermediaries conducted their
business against a background of vigorous eco-
nomic growth, low interest rates and the ab-
sence of any clear trend in stock market prices.
As a result, a strong growth rate in lending was
sustained and the growth of the net asset value
of mutual and pension funds was lower. The in-
ternationalisation of the investment portfolios of
pension funds, insurance companies and de-
posit money institutions likewise continued, as
did switching towards higher-risk assets such
as private fixed income or equities. Contributing
to this re-shaping of portfolios were the greater
issues of commercial paper and of other private
fixed-income securities, discussed in Part 1
above in which banks participated actively as
issuers. Nonetheless, these issues were not so
high as to offset the fall in public debt issues,
whereby a shortage of negotiable instruments
on the domestic market persisted, encouraging
investment in other assets of the euro area.
This was particularly notable in the case of
money-market funds (FIAMMs by their Spanish
name), but also in other groups of institutions
such as securities funds (FIMs) or deposit mon-
ey institutions.
The relatively unfavourable trend to October
of the prices of financial assets and the recent
tax changes (see Box 2) contributed to the pick-
up in bank deposits and to the decline in net
subscriptions to mutual funds. Notwithstanding,
the growth of customers’ funds did not suffice to
finance the growth of credit. Consequently, de-
posit money institutions continued to resort to
net external financing, essentially interbank bor-
rowing, which increased the net external debit
position of these institutions.
Against this backdrop, deposit money institu-
tions’ profits in the first nine months of the year
continued to grow in relation to 1998. That said,
this increase was based exclusively on the
favourable course of credit-risk and securities
write-downs, whereas net income fell for the
first time since 1995.
2.1. Deposit money institutions
Deposit money institutions (banks, savings
banks and credit co-operatives) are the main
component of the Spanish financial system.
Faced with heightening competition with one
another, with foreign banks and with other fi-
nancial entities, these institutions are immersed
in an ongoing process of adaptation to the new
environment in place as a result of external
openness, EMU and technological change. This
section reviews the activity of these institutions
during the first nine months of 1999(6). An
analysis is first made of the structure of their as-
sets and then of their liabilities, and finally their
margins and costs are studied. Annexed to this
paper is a comparative analysis of the perfor-
mance of commercial banks and savings
banks, with a somewhat broader time frame.
Notably, the two biggest mergers in the sector’s
history came about or were announced in 1999,
giving rise to two groups -BSCH and BBVA-
which respectively account for 20 % and 21 %
of the sector’s total assets.
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( 6 ) Other credit institutions, such as specialised credit
institutions (SCIs) or the ICO (Official Credit Institute), are
not analysed in view of their relative lesser significance and,
in the case of the ICO, its specific characteristics. Drawing
on 1998 figures, SCIs accounted for 2.4 % of the total
assets of credit institutions.
Despite competition from other financial in-
termediaries, Spanish deposit money institu-
tions’ business continued to grow significantly in
1999. Although average total assets (ATA)
grew by only 4.8 % in the first three quarters of
the year compared with the same period a year
earlier (which was below nominal GDP growth
for the first time in recent years), the fall in the
growth rate was attributable to the decline in
foreign bank branches’ assets (-15.1 %) and to
the effect of bank mergers(7). Without these
two effects, the overall growth of deposit money
institutions’ ATA would not have differed greatly
from 1998 (8.6 %).
Since September 1998, seven foreign banks
(five of which Japanese) have closed their
branches in Spain. Moreover, the activity of
some of the branches of foreign banks still in
Spain has diminished as a result of their trea-
sury operations being concentrated in other Eu-
ropean centres following the arrival of the euro.
Further, the merger in October 1998 of Banco
Exterior, Banco Hipotecario, Caja Postal and
Corporación Bancaria de España entailed the
cancellation of interbank operations among the
aforementioned institutions, thereby affecting
the comparison of the nine-month period in
1999 with the same period in 1998 (8). Both ef-
fects had a bearing exclusively on commercial
banks, while savings banks and credit co-oper
atives showed growth in ATA (11.3 % and
10%, respectively) far higher than that of banks
and, in the case of savings banks, higher even
than one year earlier.
The overall non-futures off-balance-sheet
operations of deposit money institutions (i.e.
contingent liabilities and contingent commit-
ments and risks) continued to increase in pro-
portion to the total balance sheet (see Table 5).
2.1.1. Asset structure
On the assets side, credit grew at a notable
rate of over 10 % year-on-year for the third con-
secutive year. The strong expansion was es-
sentially driven by the greater demand arising
from lower interest rate levels, the favourable
economic outlook and the improved financial
position of households and firms in recent
years. Offsetting this growth in credit was a sig-
nificant decline in interbank assets, predomi-
nantly in banks. Overall, as a percentage of
ATA, interbank assets were lower by more than
five percentage points, while credit exceeded
50 % of total assets (see Table 5). Somewhat
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TABLE 4
Trading volumes on derivatives markets (a)
EUR millions
MEFF RF (fixed-income) 1,825,416 319,725 286,569 141,272 110,858 67,596
Short-term 987,016 19,939 138,426 13,927 5,181 831
Futures 940,539 19,039 137,344 13,867 4,341 831
Options 46,477 900 1,082 60 840 0
Medium- and long-term 838,399 299,786 148,144 127,345 105,676 66,765
Futures 794,632 299,699 145,995 127,274 105,666 66,759
Options 43,767 87 2,149 71 11 6
MEFF RV (equities) 427,100 441,599 129,250 161,413 145,203 134,983
Ibex 35 422,098 431,640 127,231 159,241 141,459 130,941
Futures 347,116 376,587 110,135 144,143 121,449 110,995
Options 74,982 55,054 17,095 15,098 20,010 19,946
Stock options 5,002 9,959 2,020 2,172 3,744 4,042
MATIF
Short-term. Futures 3,463,216 2,749,773 600,314 1,201,693 891,088 656,992
Sources: MATIF, MEFF RF, MEFF RV and Banco de España.
(a) The volumes are expressed in monetary units and have been obtained by multiplying the number of contracts traded by their size.
1998
Q1-Q3
1999
Q1-Q3
1998
Q4 Q1
1999
Q2 Q3
(7) Unless otherwise indicated, all the data in this report
correspond to the aggregation of the institutions existing at
each point in time; consequently, some of the changes may
be due to new institutions coming into being or others ceas-
ing to operate.
(8) The merger of BCH and Banco Santander has a less-
er effect given that it occurred in April, thereby affecting the
1999 growth rate to a lesser extent.
over half of the decline in interbank assets may
be explained by the above-mentioned factors:
the merger of Banco Exterior, Banco Hipote-
cario, Caja Postal and Corporación Bancaria de
España, and the reduction in the activity of
branches of foreign banks. The rest of the de-
cline was due to the fall in interbank assets vis-
à-vis non-resident institutions, which will be dis-
cussed in the section on external financing.
The growth of credit was concentrated in op-
erations with the resident private sector, with a
rate of increase of 16.8 % (see Table 6). This
growth would rise to 18.7 % if regard were also
had to credit in the form of securities purchases
(including assets issued by mortgage securiti-
sation funds held by the institutions). Converse-
ly, credit to non-residents and to general gov-
ernment fell in relation to the period January-
September 1998. Under credit to the resident
private sector, virtually all the items grew no-
tably with the sole exception of credit to other
(non-credit) financial institutions and doubtful
loans. However, the growth of household con-
sumer credit ran at over 20 % during the first
two quarters of 1999, and that of mortgage
loans was strong. By maturity, credit at over five
years posted the highest growth rates, although
the share of floating-rate loans in deposit mon-
ey institutions’ overall lending continued to rise,
accounting for 47.6 % of total credit.
As earlier mentioned, both low interest rate
levels and the buoyancy of the economy have
contributed to the expansion of credit. Other
factors (indicated in the 1998 Annual Report) in-
clude the improvement in the financial position
of households and firms and corporate restruc-
turing. The fall in interest rates in recent years
has significantly lessened the interest burden
on corporate and household debt, enabling
these agents to take on higher levels of indebt-
edness. In relation partly to the fall in interest
rates, the prices of equity instruments have
risen strongly over recent years, leading to an
increase in the net wealth of households, which
account for an increasingly greater proportion of
the equity-holding (directly or indirectly) sectors
as a whole. Finally, the start of EMU has added
renewed momentum to corporate restructuring
processes, including the acquisition of compa-
nies in Spain or abroad. This, together with the
setting up of new firms, spurred by the econo-
my’s cyclical position, has no doubt also con-
tributed to fuelling the demand for bank credit.
Against this background of growth in the de-
mand for credit, deposit money institutions con-
tinued to cut interest rates on new credit trans-
actions for most of the period under study, in
line with the trend of interbank interest rates.
The rises recorded in the rates of medium and
long-term government debt were not reflected
in lending rates until after June and July, when
they touched bottom. Thereafter, until October
(the latest figure available as this report went to
press), there were significant increases, al-
though these varied according to the type of in-
strument and institution. The most marked in-
creases were on unsecured medium and long-
term loans, while the increases on mortgage
loans remained low owing to the greater relative
weight in such loans of floating interest rate in-
struments, indexed to short-term interest rates.
Given the relatively low sensitivity of the de-
mand for credit to changes in interest rates, the
recent rise in the cost of credit is not yet expect-
ed significantly to affect credit trends.
In real terms, the current growth of financing
extended to the non-financial private-sector is
running at around 15 %, on a par with the rates
recorded at the peak of the previous cycle
(1989). Admittedly, there are reasons that may
temporarily justify such high credit growth. But if
these rates of increase are sustained over a
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CHART 5
Trading volumes on derivatives markets.
Euro-interest-rate futures contracts.
Monthly averages (a) (b)
    Sources:  Eurex, Matif, Liffe, MEFF RF, MEFF RV and  Banco
de España.
   (a)   The volumes are expressed in monetary units and have been
obtained by multiplying the number of contracts traded by their size.
   (b)   The contracts included in each case are the following:
MATIF: Short-term: 3-month Pibor and 3-month Euribor. Long-term:
ECU Bond, Euro All Sovereigns, 5-year Matif, 5-year Euro, 30-year
E-Bond, Notional Bond and Eurobond.
EUREX: Short-term: 1-month Euromark, 1-month Euribor, 3-month
Euromark and 3-month Euribor. Long-term: Schatz, Euro Schatz,
Bobl, Euro Bobl, Comi, Conf, Euro Buxi, Jumbo-Pfandbrief, Euro
Jumbo-Pfandbrief, Bund and Euro Bund.
LIFFE: Short-term: 3-month Euromark, 3-month Eurolira, 3-month
Euribor. Long-term: Bund, Bobl, BTP, Euro Bund and Euro BTP.
MEFF: Short-term: Mibor 90 and Mibor 360. Long-term: 10-year
notional bond.
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prolonged period, they could, in addition to
jeopardising macroeconomic stability, result in
the future in a loss of quality for certain institu-
tions’ credit portfolios.
A second problem arising from strong
growth of credit is the need for institutions to
seek out the means of financing such credit.
Should the growth of deposits prove insufficient,
this may lead to balance-sheet mismatches.
This aspect is discussed in detail in the follow-
ing section.
Unlike in 1998, the share of the securities
portfolio in the total balance sheet increased in
the period of 1999 covered by this report (ac-
counting for almost 20 %), as a result of the no-
table increase posted in the first two quarters.
Deposit money institutions continued to in-
crease their investment in equities. But, more-
over, they more than offset the fall in their hold-
ings of government debt over the course of the
year with most significant increases in the rest
of their fixed-income (private and non-resident)
portfolio. This probably reflects these institu-
tions’ wish to increase their share in national
and international markets, especially in the euro
area, and also, possibly, to hold more securities
that may be used to obtain liquidity at the Ban-
co de España. Thus, the holdings of bonds of
the resident sectors, excluding general govern-
ment and credit institutions, virtually quadrupled
 the 12 months to September 1999, with a
year-on-year increase of EUR 7,543 million.
Judging by the activity on the primary market,
purchases of mortgage securitisation bonds ac-
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TABLE 5
Deposit money institutions
Balance sheet structure (a)
% of average balance sheet
ASSETS:
Cash and central banks (c) 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.4 2.7 2.4
Interbank market assets (d) 25.7 20.2 31.8 24.3 15.0 14.1
Loans 46.7 50.2 42.4 45.8 53.9 56.9
Securities portfolio 18.8 19.8 17.6 20.1 21.7 20.0
Fixed-income 14.7 15.3 13.6 15.4 17.4 15.5
Equities 4.1 4.5 4.1 4.7 4.3 4.5
Other assets 6.9 8.0 6.8 8.4 6.7 6.7
LIABILITIES:
Banco de España and
interbank market (e) 29.8 27.2 40.3 37.0 11.6 12.1
Customer funds 55.1 56.3 44.1 45.2 74.5 73.6
Non-bank creditors (f) 53.4 54.1 42.7 43.4 72.0 70.6
Debt securities 1.7 2.2 1.4 1.9 2.5 2.9
Capital 5.8 5.6 5.3 5.0 6.4 6.4
Special funds 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.4 3.1 2.9
Subordinated financing 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.4 0.8 1.0
Other liabilities 5.2 6.4 6.1 7.9 3.6 4.0
OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS:
Contingent liabilities 9.6 11.4 12.2 15.0 4.3 5.0
Commitments and contingent risks 14.6 17.1 15.9 18.9 12.5 14.5
Futures transactions 148.3 139.9 213.9 198.6 33.0 47.5
MEMORADUM ITEM:
Average total balance sheet
Balance in EUR millions 894,390 936,947 573,331 579,859 292,002 325,139
Annual growth rate 8.5 4.8 8.3 1.1 8.8 11.3
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Data relate to the institutions existing in each period.
(b) Commercial banks, savings banks and credit co-operatives. The data relate to total turnover, which includes banks’ foreign branch-
es, but not subsidiaries.
(c) Including cash, central banks (except securities purchases under repos) and Banco de España Certificates.
(d) Including lending to banks (time deposits, securities purchases under repos and securities loans) and securities purchases under re-
pos with the Banco de España.
(e) Including Banco de España and credit institutions (time deposits and securities sales under repos).
(f) Including sales of securities to customers under repos.
Total (b) Commercial banks Savings banks
1999
JAN-SEP
1998
JAN-SEP
1998
JAN-SEP
1999
JAN-SEP
1998
JAN-SEP
1999
JAN-SEP
counted for a significant portion of this increase.
The portfolio of fixed-income securities of non-
resident credit institutions and of other non-resi-
dents showed an increase on 12 months earlier
of EUR 14,955 million (84 % at banks). These
securities already accounted for 24 % of de-
posit money institutionsÕ total fixed-income port -
folio, although there were notable differences
across institutional groupings. For banks, the
non-resident fixed-income securities portfolio
represented one-third of the total, while for sav-
ings banks and credit co-operatives this figure
was below 12 %, denoting a highly different de-
gree of activity on international markets.
The item Òcash and central banksÒ grew
moderately, offsetting the decline, owing to re-
demption, in Banco de Espaa certificates of
deposit with an increase in assets at the Banco
de Espaa, the result of the higher level of re -
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TABLE 6
Operations with customers
Total loans (a) 13.7 13.4 12.2 12.4 13.4 100.0 100.0
Non-residents 25.0 8.4 –1.3 –10.5 –5.8 8.1 6.7
General government –14.9 –16.3 –10.3 –6.8 –7.1 7.5 6.1
Other resident sectors 16.0 17.0 15.7 16.4 16.8 84.4 87.1
Of which:
Mortgage loans 20.2 20.1 19.4 18.9 18.2 36.8 38.8
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Doubtful loans –25.2 –23.7 –20.5 –18.2 –14.4 2.0 1.4
Variable interest rate loans 23.9 24.6 17.2 16.5 17.6 45.8 47.6
Loans in foreign currency (b) 18.3 4.2 –19.1 –20.8 –15.7 8.8 6.4
Loans + fixed-income portfolio of
other resident sectors 15.8 17.3 16.7 17.7 18.7 85.1 88.9
Total loans to other
resident sectors (c) — 17.1 12.4 14.8 13.3 100.0 100.0
Other financial institutions — 40.8 –66.9 –68.2 –58.4 3.1 1.4
Non-financial firms — 13.5 11.7 16.4 14.4 47.0 47.0
Households and non-profit 
institutions serving households — 19.2 19.1 17.7 16.6 49.9 51.7
Consumer — 28.5 28.4 25.7 17.7 7.9 8.7
Housing — 18.8 19.0 16.1 16.5 31.0 31.9
Other — 14.0 12.9 16.4 16.2 11.0 11.1
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Up to one year — 18.7 8.4 12.9 11.8 23.7 23.3
At over five years — 20.6 19.6 19.8 16.6 57.1 59.7
Total non-bank creditors 6.5 5.0 5.4 6.2 6.6 100.0 100.0
Repos 4.2 –8.4 –10.0 –12.0 –17.5 20.8 17.0
Deposits 7.2 8.7 9.5 11.0 12.8 79.2 83.0
General government 9.6 12.8 22.9 18.1 14.2 3.0 3.3
Sight deposits 14.1 16.1 18.9 18.3 19.8 36.4 40.8
Time deposits 1.2 2.0 0.2 3.7 6.2 39.9 38.9
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Deposits with agreed maturity £ wo
years –4.2 –7.2 –6.8 –4.9 –0.3 86.6 75.8
Deposits with agreed maturity > two
years 13.8 34.0 67.4 90.7 132.2 13.4 24.2
Non-resident non-bank creditors 11.4 7.3 14.4 16.2 36.1 9.2 10.7
Creditors in foreign currency (b) 30.7 28.4 –8.7 –16.7 –5.3 6.8 5.8
Resident deposits in branches abroad83.9 56.6 12.9 10.3 –24.3 6.0 5.5
Source: Banco de España.
(a) Includes doubtful loans.
(b) To December 1998, loans/creditors in currencies other than the peseta. As from January 1999, loans/creditors in currencies other
than the euro.
(c) Only businesses in Spain.
Year-on-year growth rates % of total
1998
1998
Q4
1999
Q1 Q2 Q3
1998
JAN-SEP
1999
JAN-SEP
serve assets demanded by the new reserve re-
quirement set by the Eurosystem. Lastly, other
assets grew strongly further to the increase in
other (non-interbank) accounts with credit insti-
tutions, associated with operating changes in
interbank fund transfer procedures among
countries, following the start of EMU. This effect
tended to soften, being counterbalanced on the
liabilities side by growth of a similar amount.
2.1.2. Structure of financing
The structure of deposit money institutions’
financing was affected by various factors. On
one hand, tax changes and the diminished at-
tractiveness of mutual funds, against a back-
ground of low expected returns on financial
markets, prompted a significant growth in de-
posits. On the other, there was the effect of the
changes entailed by EMU (new monetary policy
implementation framework, single interbank
market for the euro area), the need to raise re-
sources to finance the growth of credit, in a
context of growing external indebtedness, and
the need to resolve the problem posed by the
shortage of assets to offer as collateral at
ESCB monetary intervention tenders. All these
circumstances led to a decline in the funds
raised at the Banco de España and on inter-
bank markets, to a greater weight of debt secu-
rities issues and subordinated financing and to
a notable fall in repos(9).
Deposits grew especially at savings banks
and credit co-operatives, but also at banks (7% ,
in the first three quarters, at banks, and 15 %
and 14 % at savings banks and credit co-opera-
tives, respectively). Under this heading there
was notable growth of 19 % in sight deposits
(current and savings accounts) and a recovery
in deposits with an agreed maturity, where there
was a turnaround involving deposits at less than
two years and deposits at over two years. The
latter were particularly favoured by the recent
personal income tax reform and, in a single
year, saw their share in total time deposits in-
crease from 13 % to 24 % (see Table 6). Over-
all, the growth of deposits was assisted by the
lesser attractiveness of other investment instru-
ments, such as shares in mutual funds (owing to
the less favourable outlook on capital markets)
and to the switch by the public to more liquid as-
sets, given the low interest rates prevailing. The
tax changes also favoured deposits to the detri-
ment of mutual funds (see Box 2). For the first
time, the capital gains arising on the sale of in-
vestment funds are now subject to a 20 % with-
holding, while the corresponding withholding on
returns on deposits has been cut from 25 % to
18 %. In addition, returns on deposits generated
over a period exceeding two years qualify for a
30 % reduction in the tax base, which was previ-
ously not the case.
With regard to the cost of this source of fi-
nancing, the interest rates on new deposit oper-
ations touched bottom in the third quarter of the
year, rising slightly thereafter. As in the case of
lending interest rates, the rises were sharper
and swifter on longer-dated deposits, particular-
ly on deposits at over two years.
The strong growth of non-resident non-bank
creditors and the tailing off of the process of
cross-border deposit delocation were also note-
worthy. In the period from January to September
1999, residents’ deposits in Spanish bank
branches abroad fell slightly, in contrast to their
sharp growth in previous years (in 1998, 53 % of
the change in resident creditors materialised in
branches abroad). The remuneration of the re-
serve requirement and the lesser relative signifi-
cance of the associated tax benefits, in a context
such as the present one in which interest rates
are very low, would account for this fact.
Despite the pick-up in deposits, the notable
fall in asset repos (-18 %) meant that resources
raised from customers grew but moderately (at
around 6 %). The fall in repos was due to fewer
issues of government debt, the main instrument
used in such repos, to the decline in the de-
mand for repos by mutual funds and to the
need for deposit money institutions to hold se-
curities not assigned under repurchase agree-
ments for use as collateral at the Eurosystem
liquidity tenders. In past years, banks had been
in a situation in which the volume of portfolio
securities susceptible to use as collateral was
limited. This was due to the fact that the bulk of
such instruments had been assigned under re-
purchase agreements either to the public or to
other financial institutions. That had generated
certain pressures on money markets, especially
in periods in which a high volume of coupon-
washing operations were taking place, reducing
even further the volume of assets available. To
the end of the third quarter, banks increased
their holdings of private fixed-income securities
and of fixed-income paper issued by non-resi-
dents (10), offsetting the fall in the stock of Ban-
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(10) In recent years, the Banco de España has progres-
sively extended the set of assets acceptable as collateral at
monetary intervention tenders to include private fixed-income
and also equities. Under the new framework adopted by the
ESCB, assets issued by non-residents, included in the “Tier
1” and “Tier 2” assets of the corresponding central banks,
may also be used as collateral at the Banco de España.
( 9 ) In overall terms, the fall in interbank liabilities could
again be attributed to the effect of mergers and the dimin-
ished activity of foreign branches.
co de España certificates and of government
debt, and reduced repos to the public. Both fac-
tors were conducive to an easing of the short-
age of securities besetting institutions.
Nonetheless, the new system of ESCB mone-
tary intervention tenders has given rise to fresh
needs for institutions in respect of available se-
curities.
Although the securitisation of loans enabled
the growth of credit on the balance sheet to be
reduced, customers’ resources continued to
prove insufficient to finance the expansion of
credit. In the 12 months from September 1998
to September 1999, the main source of re-
sources for savings banks and credit co-opera-
tives lay in their non-bank creditors (66 % and
64 % of the total (11), respectively), while for
banks these covered only 23 % of their financ-
ing requirements. For banks, the main source of
financing was the interbank market (44 %).
However, securities issues were relatively sig-
nificant as an alternative to the interbank mar-
ket. Securities issues accounted for almost
23 % of banks’ total resources and for 13 % of
those of savings banks, notably up on previous
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CHART 6
Net position vis-à-vis non residents
(as % of total assets)
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   Source:  Banco de España.
   (a)   Credit institutions to 1991, inclusive, and MFIs thereafter. The 1999 figure is to October.
   (b)   To 1996, inclusive, assets and liabilities vis-à-vis non-resident credit institutions. Thereafter, assets and liabilities vis-à-vis MFIs. The 1999
figure is to October.
(11) Defined as the change in total liabilities minus inter-
bank assets.
periods. Moreover, a significant portion of the
growth of non-resident non-bank creditors
(most important at banks) corresponded to re-
sources raised via international issues by non-
bank subsidiaries domiciled in tax havens. As a
result, parent bank figures would be understat-
ing the total resort to the capital markets.
Net resort to the interbank market, essential-
ly with non-resident banks, remained important.
However, one substantial difference from previ-
ous periods was that this did not lead to an in-
crease in interbank liabilities with non-residents,
but to a fall in assets. On the liabilities side, de-
posit money institutions raised the resources
they ceased to receive from the Banco de Es-
paña on the euro-area single money market,
while they reduced interbank financing from
outside the euro area.
Chart 6 depicts the growth of Spanish de-
posit money institutions’ foreign interbank liabili-
ties, which rose to over 12 % of the total bal-
ance sheet in 1998. Such a high level may per-
haps explain why banks sought in 1999 to re-
duce their interbank assets instead of raising
their liabilities further. In any event, in net terms,
Spanish money deposit institutions’ foreign in-
terbank position stood at an historical high. The
creation of a single interbank market in the euro
area has provided for readier financing of Span-
ish banks abroad and lessened the significance
of the overall net external position. That said,
certain risks have persisted. These arise, firstly,
from the fact that financing in the euro interbank
market is not fully comparable, in terms of liq-
uidity risks, to financing from the Banco de Es-
paña; and secondly, because the bulk of Span-
ish banks’ net external debit position continues
to be with institutions outside the euro area.
Finally, it should be mentioned that capital
and reserves scarcely grew, though subordinat-
ed financing did. In consolidated terms and with
data to June 1999, the BIS ratio (12) for deposit
money institutions as a whole stood at 11 %,
significantly above the minimum required level
(8 %). With regard to capital requirements, a
consultative document was published in June
this year by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision proposing an amendment of the
1988 Accord (see Box 3).
2.1.3. Income and costs
In the first three quarters of 1999, and com-
pared with the same period a year earlier, the
operating margins of money deposit institutions
continued to narrow, despite which profit before
tax continued to grow (see Table 7). Once
again, this was due to the performance of the
items under net income. Specifically, total write-
downs fell by 30 % (11 basis points in terms of
ATA) as a result, essentially, of the lesser need
for provisioning on securities and for country-
risk provisioning. Both were relatively high in
the first three quarters of 1998 owing to the
Russian debt crisis and its repercussions on in-
ternational stock exchanges and markets.
All three margins (net interest margin, gross
margin and net margin) above the profit-before-
tax item fell by approximately 10 basis points.
Profit before tax, however, grew from 0.98 % of
ATA to 0.99 %, whereby the pre-tax return on
equity once more grew, rising from 17.1 % to
17.6 %.
The fall in net interest, as a percentage of
ATA, was due above all to the continuing nar-
rowing of spreads on lending-deposit opera-
tions in pesetas. Although the spread between
lending and deposit rates on new credit and de-
posit operations in pesetas held relatively stable
from early 1998 onwards (see Chart 7), margins
still continued to fall in terms of return and aver-
age cost. This is due to the longer average ma-
turity on loans compared with on deposits and,
therefore, to the greater time elapsing before
lending - as opposed to deposit - interest rates
are updated. The lending-deposit spread on
new operations stabilised at around 3 %; thus,
unless there was a rise, there would still be
room for downward movement in the average
return-average cost spread (which reflects all
operations outstanding), which stood at 3.5 %.
Commissions relating to the commercialisa-
tion of financial products (mutual funds in partic-
ular) and overall commissions in general contin-
ued to grow considerably (12 %). In the case of
the former, however, such growth was clearly
below that of the previous years. This was due
to the much less expansionary course of mutual
funds (see related section). The growth of com-
missions was checked by lower income on fi-
nancial operations, as a result of which the
gross income margin diminished as a percent-
age of ATA. Notable under income on financial
operations was the negative income (of the or-
der of EUR 500 million) arising on the trading
portfolio, in contrast to the positive result of
EUR 644 million in the first three quarters of
1998.
Operating expenses grew moderately
( 2 . 8%), but above gross income. Accordingly,
the overall efficiency ratio (operating expens-
es/gross income) worsened by more than one
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(12) Own funds as a percentage of risk-weighted assets;
the minimum percentage required is 8 %.
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BOX 3
Proposals for reform of the Basel Accord on the capital requirements for credit institutions
Last June, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published an important consultative document containing
various proposals for a new scheme of capital requirements for credit institutions and groups of credit institutions, applicable at
the international level, to replace the one currently in force under the 1988 Basel Accord, as subsequently amended (1). The
objective of the document is to canvass the opinions of the various sectors involved. These would then serve as the basis for
the preparation of definitive proposals in the year 2000, leading to the eventual signing of a new international accord. Accord-
ingly, the proposals are not closed, but rather very much open, with the details of many points still to be elaborated.
The 1988 Basel Accord is the basis for the current legislation on the minimum capital of credit institutions not only in the
signatory countries (G 10) but also in many other countries, including those of the European Union and, therefore, Spain, so
that its amendment in the near future is a matter of great importance. The purpose of the reform is, while maintaining the posi-
tive aspects (the achievement of higher levels of capitalisation of national and international financial systems, the establishment
of uniform international rules), to reform those aspects that have been most problematic. These relate, above all, to the inability
of the original risk classification system to discriminate adequately according to the true credit risk of each asset, which gives
rise to certain perverse effects.
It should be noted, for example, that all credit risks with non-banking firms are assigned a coefficient of 100 % (2), irrespec-
tive of the firm’s credit quality. This means that loans to firms with a high credit quality are subject to the same capital require-
ment as loans to firms of doubtful credit quality. At the same time, loans to OECD governments, by the mere fact of OECD
membership, are subject to a 0 % coefficient, although the credit ratings of the OECD member countries vary considerably. The
situation regarding the requirements for interbank loans is similar. These depend on whether the borrower bank is domiciled in
an OECD country. These inconsistencies have resulted in the growing use by banks of regulatory arbitrage operations. For ex-
ample, loans to higher-credit-quality firms, where the real risk does not correspond to the regulatory capital requirements, are
securitised and only the loans with the lowest credit quality within each grouping are kept on the balance sheet. Moreover, it is
argued that the current coefficients, by favouring short-term interbank loans over long-term loans, encouraged the high short-
term foreign indebtedness of the banks of the Asian countries afflicted by the 1997 crisis, this being considered one of the fac-
tors contributing to the Asian crisis.
The proposed new scheme of capital requirements of the BCBS is based on three pillars:
a) the existence of certain minimum capital requirements;
b) supervision of the internal risk control mechanisms of the institutions;
c) a strengthening of market discipline.
As regards the minimum capital requirements for credit risk, three alternatives are proposed, according to the degree of de-
velopment of the risk control mechanisms of each institution. In general, the BCBS proposes replacing the current scheme,
based on the distinction between OECD and non-OECD countries, by a scheme based, to a greater extent, on the credit ratings
assigned by rating agencies (such as Standard & Poors, Moody’s and Fitch Ibca) to countries and firms (external rating). Alter-
natively, those institutions which demonstrate sufficient capacity for the purpose would be able to use a system based on their
own credit ratings of counterparties (internal rating). Finally, the possibility is anticipated of institutions being able, in future, to
use formal credit risk models to calculate their minimum capital requirements. This is not considered feasible in the short term,
given the problems that still exist for the assessment of such models.
Changing to a system based on counterparties’ credit ratings would certainly help to strengthen the tie between the capital
requirements and true credit risk of the institutions, but would not be without problems. A first and obvious problem would be the
reliability of the credit ratings and their implications in cases of sudden losses of confidence. For example, the rating agencies
have been widely criticised for their inability to anticipate the problems of the Asian countries afflicted by the 1997 crisis and for
their over-reaction once the crisis had begun. Against this background, to link the capital requirements of credit institutions to
credit ratings could make the system even more unstable. Also, the existence of credit ratings is limited, above all, to large
mainly US firms. This raises the problem of what to do about unrated firms. The proposal of the BCBS (which applies a coeffi-
cient of 100 % to unrated firms and of 150 % to firms with a low credit rating, may give rise to perverse effects on the bond mar-
ket and on the incentives facing rating agencies. In any event, given all its problems, the need to change the current system is
manifest, so that progress along the lines indicated by the BCBS is necessary.
A more refined measurement of credit risk must be accompanied by the consideration of other risks previously considered
implicitly along with the credit risk. It is intended that the reform of the 1988 Accord should not result in an undue decline in the
capitalisation of banks, with negative consequences for financial stability. The BCBS therefore proposes that the institutions
should be subject not only, as at present, to the minimum capital requirements for credit and market risk, but also to capital re-
quirements for interest rate risk in the banking book, when this is significantly higher than average, as well as for operational
risks. The BCBS’s June document makes proposals in this respect that are even more tentative.
In any case, irrespective of the degree of success in establishing minimum capital requirements that are truly linked to the
real risk of the institutions, the growing complexity of the institution’s operations makes it necessary to supplement these mea-
sures with what the BCBS calls the second and third pillars. That means promoting both internal and external risk controls, de-
riving from the market itself. From the viewpoint of internal control of the institutions, the supervisors should require each insti-
tution to have an internal risk-control system, supervise its operation and take effective action in the event of risk situations, with
the power to require levels of capital above the minimum in the event that the situation of the institution so requires. Finally,
market discipline may also play an important role in the promotion of a stable and solvent financial system, for which purpose
the BCBS stresses the need to improve the transparency of the institutions. To this end, certain general binding principles could
be established.
(1) “A new capital adequacy framework”, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (June 1999).
(2) This means that the general requirement to maintain a minimum volume of capital equivalent to 8 % of risk positions is fully applied. When the coefficient
is 20 %, for example, a volume of capital equivalent to 1.6 % (20 % * 8 %) of the risk exposure is required.
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percentage point, shifting from 64 % to 65.3 %.
This deterioration occurred at all groups of insti-
tutions, except credit co-operatives. The diver-
gence between operating expenses at banks
and at savings banks also persisted. While sav-
ings banks continued to pursue their policy of
expansion, banks were applying a staff restruc-
turing policy, meaning that the growth of their
operating expenses was very low. Nonetheless,
the higher growth of ATA at savings banks
meant that operating expenses as a proportion
of ATA were falling to a greater extent at sav-
ings banks than at banks.
As a result of the foregoing, the net income
of deposit money institutions as a whole fell 3 %
in the first three quarters of 1999, compared
with growth of 8.4 % in the same period in
1998. The sizeable fall in loan and securities
write-downs, together with income arising on
securities and property sales (accounting for
1 8 % of profit before tax) and other results
meant profits continued growing in 1999, albeit
at a lower rate than in 1998.
However, loan write-downs were now stand-
ing at very low levels. Moreover, given the ma-
turity of mutual-fund business, such strong
growth in commissions as that observed in the
recent past would not be foreseeable, and in-
come relating to financial operations was char-
acterised by its erraticism. Consequently, it was
likely that banks would not be able in the future
to offset fresh reductions in the spread between
lending and deposit operations with customers
with the foregoing factors, as they had done in
the past. That said, they could make use of the
strong, unrealised capital gains built up in their
portfolios (which accounted for 3.3 % of total
ATA)). But, in any event, the offsetting of a po-
tential narrowing in the net interest margin
should reside increasingly on the control of op-
erating expenses.
Admittedly, the reduction in write-downs on
the credit portfolio was partly due to institutions’
improved procedures for monitoring credit risks.
But it likewise reflected the strong anti-cyclical
character of the default rate and the existence
of a regulation on provisions for loan losses re-
TABLE 7
Deposit money institutions
Structure of the profit and loss account
% of average balance sheet
(+) Interest income 5.80 4.72 5.71 4.64 5.93 4.81
(–) Interest expenses 3.50 2.51 3.82 2.84 2.96 2.02
Net interest income 2.30 2.21 1.90 1.80 2.96 2.79
(+) Net commissions 0.66 0.70 0.67 0.74 0.63 0.64
(+) Income on financial
operations 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.16 0.09
Gross income 3.10 2.98 2.71 2.61 3.75 3.52
(–) Operating expenses 1.99 1.95 1.74 1.73 2.39 2.27
Net income 1.12 1.03 0.96 0.88 1.36 1.25
(–) Write-downs and privisions 0.36 0.25 0.35 0.19 0.41 0.35
(+) Other income 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.31 0.32
Profit before tax 0.98 0.99 0.81 0.83 1.26 1.22
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Average total assets (EUR m) 894.390 936.947 573.331 579.859 292.002 325.139
Growth rates:
Total assets 8.5 4.8 8.3 1.1 8.8 11.3
Net interest income 5.2 0.5 9.5 –3.6 0.8 4.9
Gross income 5.6 0.7 6.7 –2.3 4.4 4.4
Net income 8.4 –3.0 15.3 –7.6 1.5 2.1
Profit before tax 11.8 6.3 12.7 4.8 11.3 7.8
Profit before tax
% of capital and reserves 17.1 17.6 15.4 16.6 19.7 19.1
Source: Banco de España.
Total Commercial banks Savings banks
1999
JAN-SEP
1998
JAN-SEP
1998
JAN-SEP
1999
JAN-SEP
1998
JAN-SEP
1999
JAN-SEP
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quiring that institutions should make provision
only as and when debtors incurred delays in re-
spect of their payment obligations. Generally, in
the developed countries, credit institutions’ pro-
visions for loan losses show a much more sta-
ble time profile than in the Spanish case and, at
present, a higher level of provisioning. In this
respect, the Banco de España recently(13) ap-
proved an amendment to Accounting Circular
4/1991. Specifically, it addresses the setting up
of a fund for the statistical coverage of loan
losses. The aim of the new regulation is that in-
stitutions should set aside provisions during pe-
riods of buoyant economic activity, in which the
cost of provisioning is lower owing to the exis-
tence of higher profits, and to which they may
resort in periods in which the default rate rises
and profits are lower.
2.2. Other financial intermediaries
This section analyses recent developments
at the so-called institutional investors, i.e. mutu-
al funds, pension funds and insurance compa-
nies (14). The weight of this group of institutions
in the financial system has progressively in-
creased as a result of very strong growth in re-
cent years, especially in the case of mutual
funds. The growth of this type of financial inter-
mediary is playing, and will continue to play in
the future, a pivotal role in the development of
Spanish capital markets. The high volume of
assets they manage means they are key play-
ers in such markets. Moreover, they contribute
to increasing the range of investment opportuni-
ties for the public in general. In this connection,
various measures have been introduced in re-
cent months. These are aimed at providing for
the development of new vehicles, such as funds
of funds and subordinate and principal funds; at
adding flexibility to investment opportunities and
to the workings of mutual funds investing in
government securities and of real-estate portfo-
lio investment institutions; at adapting the regu-
lations governing venture capital companies;
and at improving investor-information proce-
dures.
2.2.1. Mutual funds
In terms of collective investment, mutual
funds are the most developed segment in the
Spanish economy. Indeed, they have reached a
significant degree of maturity. The net asset
value managed by mutual funds in the first
quarter of 1999 amounted to 41 % of GDP,
compared with 68 % in the United States or 22
% in the United Kingdom, according to data
from the European Federation of Collective In-
vestment Institutions. Other European countries
such as Italy or France, in which mutual funds
have also grown strongly in recent years, stand
at a similar level to Spain, while in Germany or
Japan, mutual funds are much more under-de-
veloped (less than 10 % of GDP). In relation to
bank liabilities, the net asset value of mutual
funds in Spain as of September 1999 account-
ed for almost 40 % of deposit money institu-
tions’ total non-bank creditors.
On provisional INVERCO data for Septem-
ber 1999, the net asset value of mutual funds
(FIAMMs and FIMs) had grown by only EUR
1.5 billion in the first three quarters of the year.
This was the result of a decline of EUR 6.3 bil-
lion in FIAMMs and an increase of EUR 7.8 bil-
lion in FIMs. This signified a very small increase
in the net asset value of mutual funds, after
several years’ strong and continuous growth
(up EUR 41 billion in 1998 and 50 billion in
1997). Indeed, in the third quarter of the year,
the net asset value had even fallen (see Chart
8). As regards the other collective investment
institutions, the information available from the
CNMV (Spanish National Securities Market
Commission) for June 1999 highlighted the con-
tinuing strong growth rates of the net asset val-
ue of open-end investment companies (SIM-
CAV by their Spanish name) and of real-estate
(13) At the meeting of its Governing Council on Decem-
ber 17th 1999.
(14) Other financial intermediaries such as securities-
dealer companies and agency brokers are not considered in
this paper since, by virtue of the nature of their activity, the
volume of their financial assets and liabilities accounts for
less than 1 % of the financial sector’s (credit institutions and
insurance companies) total financial assets and liabilities.
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mutual funds (FIIs), albeit from very low starting
points. Conversely, the expansion of the busi-
ness volume in Spain of foreign collective in-
vestment institutions moderated considerably in
the first half of the year. Overall, closed-end in-
vestment companies (SIMs), SIMCAVs, FIIs
and foreign collective investment institutions ac-
counted, in June, for 7 % of the total net asset
value of FIMs and FIAMMs.
The scant growth of mutual funds may be at-
tributed both to the small volume of net sub-
scriptions and to the decline in capital gains
arising on valuation changes. Several factors
contributed to detracting from the attractiveness
of investment in mutual funds and in domestic
financial instruments in general. These were,
namely: the low level of short-term interest
rates; the expectations, first, and the realisation,
subsequently, of capital losses on fixed-income
funds, as a result of the rise in long-term inter-
est rates; and the erraticism of Spanish share
prices during the course of the year. Further, as
earlier indicated, the onset of 1999 saw a
change in the tax arrangements for mutual
funds. While not ceasing to be favourable to
these funds, the arrangements did make them
somewhat less competitive compared with oth-
er alternative investments such as deposits or
insurance. As a result, and drawing on CNMV
data, the volume of net subscriptions to mutual
funds fell to EUR 6.7 billion in the first two quar-
ters of 1999 compared with the figure of over
EUR 28 billion for the previous year. And, on
provisional figures, the volume turned negative
in the third quarter. After several years’ strong
growth, the fall in the volume of net subscrip-
tions is consistent with the degree of maturity
attained by the mutual funds sector in the Span-
ish economy.
As was the case in 1998, the low levels of
interest rates on short-term investments and
public debt drove investors to demand (and
fund managers to offer) funds with a slightly
higher risk profile in exchange for correspond-
ingly higher expected returns. Accordingly,
there continued to be a net withdrawal of share-
holders from FIAMMs throughout this period,
while the number of shareholders in FIMs in-
creased. Although the current situation of the
equity and long-term bond markets may lead
mutual fund shareholders to adopt a somewhat
more conservative attitude, a return to the fund
structure of some years back -when very short-
dated investments in domestic public debt pre-
dominated- is not expected. The present struc-
ture, which is much more diversified in terms of
maturities and risks, is not only more consistent
with a medium-term time horizon, typical of fund
investors, and with the growth of domestic and
euro-area capital markets; it is, moreover, in
line with developments on the other European
markets.
In the first two quarters of the year, on
CNMV data, a notable 42 % of net subscrip-
tions captured by FIMs were for funds de-
scribed as international according to the new
CNMV classification (15). Overall, these funds
already accounted in June for 12 % of the total
net asset value of FIMs (9.1 % in December
1998). Furthermore, grouping together the
types of funds defined by the CNMV on the ba-
is of whether they are pure fixed-income,
mixed, pure equity or guaranteed, the bulk of
the new resources raised by the funds were in-
vested in mixed funds (72 %), with 20 % routed
into pure equity funds and less than 5 % into
pure fixed-income funds and guaranteed funds
alike (due in this latter case to the decline in
fixed-income guaranteed funds). However, in
terms of cumulative net asset value as of June
1999, pure fixed-income funds, mixed funds
and guaranteed funds each accounted for ap-
proximately 30 % of the total net asset value,
with the remaining 10 % represented by pure
equity funds (8.7 % in December 1998).
Turning to FIAMMs, there was, as is dis-
cussed elsewhere in this report, a shift towards
international instruments. But this phenomenon
was centred on the euro area which, for portfo-
lio risk purposes, is currently on an equal foot-
ing with domestic investments. The group of FI-
AMMs investing more than 5 % of their portfolio
in assets not denominated in euros accounted
for only 0.3 % of the total net asset value of FI-
AMMs as of June 1999.
With regard to the breakdown of funds by fi-
nancial group (banks, savings banks, etc.),
there were no significant differences from one
group to another in the first two quarters of the
year. Consequently, banks retained the leading
position in mutual fund-related business, with
63 % of the total net asset value of FIMs and
FIAMMs as of June 1999, with savings banks
(29 %) following. The possibility of major future
growth in unit-linked funds leading to greater
participation of insurance companies in the
management of mutual funds is limited by the
fact that a majority of the insurance companies
that offer unit-linked funds are subsidiaries of
deposit money institutions. As a result, the
management of these funds tends to be en-
trusted to the corresponding fund manager of
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( 1 5 ) Fixed-income or mixed fixed-income funds with a
volume of assets in currencies other than the euro of over
5 %, equity funds or mixed equity funds with a volume of
assets in currencies other than the euro of over 30 % and
global funds, i.e. those with no defined investment policy
and which, therefore, may invest in any market.
the banking group. International fund man-
agers, who might gain in prominence as a con-
sequence of the demand by shareholders for
portfolios that are more diversified international-
ly, are faced with the problem of competing with
the distribution network of national deposit mon-
ey institutions.
Analysis of the assets in which FIMs and
FIAMMs invest the funds raised from share-
holders reveal, logically, that these are greatly
influenced by the relative performance of the
different types of funds. Hence, in recent
years, there has been a progressive increase
in assets with a higher level of risk and return
and in international assets. The process of in-
ternationalisation has quickened significantly
since the last quarter of 1998 and during the
first two quarters of 1999 (see Chart 8). This
process is closely connected with the start of
EMU. Thus, of the 26.4 % of the total net asset
value of FIMs accounted for by the foreign
portfolio as of June 1999, 74 % related to
euro-denominated instruments. The process
was also intense in FIAMMs. Whereas the for-
eign portfolio accounted for only 1.6 % in De-
cember 1997, by June 1999 this figure stood
at 19.6 % of the total net asset value (93 % of
which in euros). Foreign instruments in euros
virtually doubled in the period from January to
June in 1999, in FIMs and FIAMMs alike; on
the contrary, foreign instruments in currencies
other than the euro fell over the same period
as a result of an increase in equity and a de-
crease in fixed income from outside the euro
area. This strong rise in assets in the euro
area shows Spanish fund managers have
adapted rapidly to the risk diversification pos-
sibilities offered by EMU (e.g. in equity or in
private fixed income) but, above all, it high-
lights the shortage of negotiable securities on
domestic markets. For FIAMMs, for instance,
the negative net issues of Treasury bills made
it necessary to seek out alternative low-risk
short-term assets in which to invest. EMU has
offered them the possibility of investing in oth-
er countries’ short-term government debt se-
curities, free from exchange risk, thereby ex-
plaining the strong growth of their foreign as-
sets in euros.
Also notable in connection with the perfor-
mance of FIMs’ portfolio at net realisable value
in the first half of the year was the moderate
growth of domestic equity (dipping from 10.1 %
of the total net asset value in December 1998 to
9.4 % in June 1999). This was in comparison
with foreign equity instruments from the euro
area and from outside the euro area, which in-
creased by three points as a percentage of net
asset value (from 5.6 % to 8.6 %), and the high-
ly significant growth of short-term private fixed-
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income instruments, the result of the renewed
vigour of the domestic market for commercial
paper. Conversely, repos continued to decline
in absolute terms, as did Treasury bills and
long-term private fixed-income instruments. In
FIAMMs, repos and government debt also fell
and private fixed-income instruments grew.
2.2.2. Pension funds
In December 1998, the net asset value of
pension funds accounted for 5.7 % of Spanish
GDP, far below the related figure for mutual
funds. This underscores the fact that their de-
velopment in Spain has been much slower than
that of mutual funds. Although their level is
comparable with that of most of the major Euro-
pean countries such as Germany, France or
Italy, it is far below that of countries such as
United States, United Kingdom or Netherlands,
where the related percentage exceeds 70 %
(INTERSEC data).
On provisional INVERCO data to Septem-
ber, the growth rate of pension funds also fell in
1999. However, they did so to a lesser extent
than mutual funds. In the first nine months of
1999, the net asset value of pension funds in-
creased by EUR 837 million, somewhat less
than half the growth recorded in the same peri-
od in 1998 (EUR 2,196 million), but somewhat
over half the growth of the net asset value of
mutual funds in the same period.
Gross (net) contributions in the aforemen-
tioned period, estimated drawing on a represen-
tative sample of 85 % of total net asset value,
amounted to EUR 2,950 (1,010) million. Al-
though there is no comparable information for
1998, comparing the year-on-year growth rate
of net asset value (which includes net contribu-
tions plus revaluation) with the cumulative re-
turn over the past twelve months allows the
course of net contributions to be approximated.
Under this hypothesis, contributions to pension
funds in the first three quarters of 1999 would
have fallen slightly, with the heavy decline in re-
turns most accounting for the lower growth of
net asset value (see Chart 9). In any event, a
considerable portion of contributions to pension
funds is concentrated in the final quarter of
each year, as a result of which the other quar-
ters may not be sufficiently significant.
With a view to the future, the prospects for
pension funds growth remain favourable. In ad-
dition to demographic factors and the growth in
disposable income to invest, as a consequence
of the growth of national per capita income, the
recent publication in the BOE (Official State
Gazette) of the regulation on the mandatory
“externalisation” of companies’ pension commit-
ments to their employees (the transfer of in-
house provisions to an external pension fund or
insurance company) should be conducive to the
continuing growth of employee schemes in the
future.
The breakdown of the portfolio of pension
funds was along similar lines to that of FIMs.
The share of both equity and foreign instru-
ments increased at the expense of government
debt, albeit less markedly so than at FIMs (see
Chart 9). One particular contrast was dis-
cernible in the fact that the relative growth of
the foreign portfolio slowed, according to the
data available and unlike in mutual funds, in the
period under analysis after having run very high
in 1998. Foreign assets thus moved from ac-
counting for 16.7 % of the total net asset value
in December 1998 to 16 % in June 1999, with a
slight decline in the fixed-income foreign portfo-
lio and a marginal increase in the equity foreign
portfolio. This was consistent with the develop-
ments observed in FIMs’ portfolio in currencies
other than the euro. Accordingly, it appears that
the difference might have been due to the be-
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haviour of the foreign portfolio in euros. In pen-
sion funds, the lesser volume of funds in abso-
lute terms and the greater liberty to invest in
whatsoever instruments lessened the problem
of the shortage of negotiable instruments and,
therefore, alleviated the need to resort to other
fixed-income markets in the euro area.
2.2.3. Insurance companies
The volume of premiums issued by insur-
ance companies has, as a percentage of GDP,
grown continuously in recent years. Life assur-
ance has contributed most significantly to this,
with mixed products combining insurance ele-
ments with saving aspects and, therefore, com-
peting directly with other financial intermedi-
aries. The prospects are for such growth to con-
tinue in the future. On EUROSTAT data, the
volume of Spanish insurers’ premiums account-
ed for 5.4 % of GDP in 1997, while the related
figures for United Kingdom, France, Germany
and Italy were 11.7 %, 9.9 %, 6.4 % and 4.2 %,
respectively. Specifically, Spain stood above
Italy but below the other three countries.
Various events have arisen over recent
months that might prove favourable to the insur-
ance business. First, in the tax domain, the per-
sonal income tax reforms in place since the on-
set of 1999 have entailed certain benefits for
saving products linked to life assurance (see
Box 2). In this same area, the treatment for tax
purposes of insurance policies invested in unit-
linked funds and whose risk is assumed by the
policy-holder has been clarified. Such instru-
ments are considered, under certain conditions,
as insurance products and are entitled, there-
fore, to the related tax benefits and to the possi-
bility of switching funds at no tax cost. Finally,
the recent approval of the above-mentioned
regulation on the “externalisation” of compa-
nies’ pension commitments is a further factor
that may be conducive to group life assurance
policies being taken out.
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TABLE 8
Insurance companies (a)
INDICATORS OF ACTIVITY (b):
Premiums written 1,9 12,1 8,5 8,2
Life -4,2 20,9 16,8 7,7
Non-life 6,7 6,0 2,0 8,7
Technical reserves 18,3 18,2 17,3 15,2
Actuarial reserves 22,5 23,1 21,8 17,1
Other reserves 9,5 6,4 5,0 9,0
Net investments 24,8 19,1 18,2 12,3
STRUCTURE OF GROSS INVESTMENTS (c):
Tangible invesments 9,2 7,9 7,1 6,3
Loans and credits 2,6 2,1 1,6 1,8
Equity portfolio 5,7 5,4 5,3 5,9
In related companies (d) 3,3 3,5 3,1 2,9
Other equity 2,4 1,9 2,2 3,0
Fixed-income portfolio (e) 57,7 51,2 51,9 56,3
Deposits (f) 2,6 3,6 4,1 9,7
Indexed securities (g) — — — 0,6
Shares in mutual funds (g) — — — 5,2
Other financial investments 22,2 29,7 30,1 11,2
Investments for the account of policyholders (h) — — — 2,9
Sources: Dirección General de Seguros and Banco de España.
(a) To 1997, rates and ratios refer to the business in Spain of public limited companies, mutual insurance companies and foreign
branches; in 1998, to the total business of public limited companies and mutual insurance companies.
(b) Annual % growth rates.
(c) As % of total.
(d) Shares in group and associated companies.
(e) To 1997, included only long-term securities. Short-term securities (Treasury bills) appeared under other financial investments.
(g) Items previously included under other financial investments.
(h) Insurance in which the policy-holder assumes the investment risk (unit-linked funds).
1995 1996 1997 1998
The short-term economic information on in-
surance usually appears with some delay. The
latest official DGS (Directorate General for In-
surance) data are for year-end 1998. Table 8
shows some of the most relevant aspects of ac-
tivity in this sector. In any event, it should be
mentioned that 1998 saw a change in the chart
of accounts for insurance companies, along
with changes in the scope of the DGS statistics.
Consequently, comparisons with previous years
occasionally prove difficult.
Taking the total insurance activity of public
limited companies and mutual insurers in both
Spain and abroad, the volume of premiums is-
sued was EUR 25,651 million in 1998. Of this
amount, EUR 12,164 million related to the life
sector and EUR 13,488 million to non-life insur-
ance. This volume of premiums signified year-
on-year growth of 8.2 %, similar to that in 1997.
However, unlike what had happened in previ-
ous years, growth was distributed almost evenly
between life and non-life business. That meant
lower growth in life business and, consequently,
in the mathematical provisions and in the stock
of investments by insurance companies (see
Table 8). In any event, such investments
amounted to more than EUR 63 billion, a higher
volume than that of FIAMMs and over twice the
net asset value of pension funds.
The lower growth of life assurance in 1998
might have been due to the uncertainty sur-
rounding its future tax treatment and to the less-
er attractiveness of mixed saving-insurance
products, as a result of low interest rates. Some
of this uncertainty may have run into the first
half of the current year. Nonetheless, in the
third quarter there was a very significant pick-up
further to which, according to employers’ asso-
ciation data for bancassurance firms, premiums
issued by their associates (comprising around
60 % of total life business) grew 22 % over the
course of the first nine months of the year in re-
lation to the same period a year earlier.
Regarding the breakdown of insurance com-
panies’ investment portfolio, the change in the
chart of accounts entailed a break in many of
the items from 1998 onwards (see Table 8).
However, of note were the continuing fall in the
relative weight of tangible investments, the
growth of the equity portfolio and the relevance
acquired by shares in mutual funds (5.2 % of
the total) and the growth of investment on be-
half of policy-holders. Included under this latter
category are investments in unit-linked funds
(2.9 % of the total).
22.12.1999.
ANNEX 1
COMPARISON OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
BANKS AND SAVINGS BANKS
The purpose of this annex is to analyse
briefly the main differences in the recent devel-
opment of the two main groups of credit institu-
tion in Spain (banks and savings banks). A
comparison is made of the changes in the
structure and main headings of their balance
sheets and in the main components of their
profit and loss accounts between 1995 and the
third quarter of 1999 (the latest period for which
data is available). Broadly, it can be stated that
during this period the differences in the produc-
tive specialisation of banks and savings banks
have not been reduced appreciably, with the
latter concentrating relatively more on retail ac-
tivity. This specialisation is the main factor ex-
plaining most of the differences that are dis-
cussed in more detail below.
Structure of the balance sheet and its main
components
As can be seen in Chart A1, between 1995
and 1998 the total balance sheets of the banks
and savings banks, in terms of GDP, grew simi-
larly, with the larger relative size of the former
clearly maintained. In 1999, however, while the
total balance sheet of the savings banks rose
slightly, that of the banks fell by almost four per-
centage points. The reasons for this fall have
already been discussed in detail in the main
body of the text.
As regards balance-sheet structure, the
main differences between these two groups
have traditionally consisted in savings banks’
greater specialisation in retail business, with a
predominance of loan/deposit activity as
against interbank- and wholesale-market inter-
mediation. As a result, the relative weight of
loans is much lower in the banks’ balance
sheet, currently standing at an average of
slightly more than 40 % of total assets while in
savings banks it exceeds 56 %. Also, the higher
relative weight of customer deposits in the bal-
ance sheet of savings banks is notable (above
70 % of total liabilities, as against more than
45% in the case of banks).
During the period analysed, the differences
in the structure of the business of these institu-
tions have only been reduced in relative terms,
with a certain increase in the weight of the lend-
ing and deposit activity of banks, at the ex-
pense of interbank balances. The savings
banks, meanwhile, have recorded a continuous
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increase in the weight of interbank financing, as
a consequence of the low growth in their de-
posits relative to their lending. It should be
stressed that the growth in the total lending of
savings banks clearly exceeded that of banks in
the period analysed. The latter grew at annual
rates of around 10 %, and the former at rates
between 10 and 17 %.
As can be seen in Chart A2, this strong
growth in lending has only given rise to a rela-
tive reduction in the differences between the
banks and savings banks in relation to the dis-
tribution of lending both in terms of risk type
and purpose. Despite the significant growth in
banks’ secured lending and housing loans,
loans to finance productive activities and unse-
cured lending continued to be the main compo-
nents of their lending. In the case of savings
banks, there was also a relative increase in un-
secured lending and loans to finance productive
activities, although they did not reach the same
relative weights as secured lending and hous-
ing loans. The strong growth in savings banks’
lending to non-residents, at rates of more than
30 % during the period, is notable. This reflects
the progressive internationalisation of the activi-
ty of these institutions. However, the impor-
tance of lending to non-residents by savings
banks, at around 1 % of the total balance sheet,
is still well below the weight of such lending by
banks, at almost 5 % of the total balance sheet.
As already mentioned in the main text, the
strong growth rates recorded for lending were
not matched by comparable growth rates for
deposits. This forced both banks and savings
banks to resort to alternative sources of financ-
ing to cover the growing gap between these two
items. Chart A3 shows how the gap between
lending and deposits was financed by the banks
and savings banks. The former made greater
use of interbank borrowing from non-resident
credit institutions, while the latter, although they
also used this method, chose to reduce their
lending positions with resident credit institu-
tions. It should be stressed that in 1999 the
component responsible for the imbalance be-
tween the growth of investments and resources
was not lending and deposit activity but rather
the strong growth in the securities portfolio net
of repurchase agreements. The factors explain-
ing these developments have already been
mentioned in the main text of the report, but it is
worth pointing out the difference in the compo-
sition of this increase in the portfolio of the
banks and savings banks, since in the former
there was an increase in the portfolio of fixed-
income securities, particularly those issued by
non-residents and, to a lesser extent, a fall in
outstanding repurchase agreements, while in
the savings banks the reductions in outstanding
repurchase agreements and the increase in the
equity portfolio were the two items contributing
to the growth in the securities portfolio net of re-
purchase agreements. This could reflect a spe-
cific strategy on the part of savings banks. In
this respect, it should be noted that the share-
holdings of savings banks in non-financial firms
rose from 1.35 % of their total balance sheet in
1995 to 2.56 % in the third quarter of 1999,
reaching levels similar to those recorded by the
banks.
In any event, a clear result of the widening of
the gap between lending and deposits has been
a deterioration in the net external position of
banks and savings banks, with the deterioration
in that of the bank’s being greater. There were,
however, notable differences in the change in
composition of this net external position. In the
case of banks, there was a similar deterioration
in the position vis-à-vis euro-area residents and
vis-à-vis the residents of other countries, al-
though the position vis-à-vis the former deterio-
rated slightly more than that vis-à-vis the latter
in 1999. In the savings banks, in 1999, there
was an improvement in the net position vis-à-
vis euro-area residents which was offset by a
larger deterioration in the position vis-à-vis the
residents of other countries. Accordingly, al-
though both groups of institution resorted to for-
eign borrowing to cover the gap between the
growth in their investments and deposits, the
composition of this borrowing differs. In the
case of the banks funds obtained in the euro
area, probably denominated in euro, predomi-
nate. In the case of the savings banks, borrow-
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CHART A.1
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ing from the residents of countries outside the
euro area, probably denominated in US dollars,
predominates. However, although the financing
of savings banks could be considered more
risky due to the exchange risk involved (assum-
ing that this risk has not been hedged) the
amounts of the same are much lower than
those of the banks and hardly represent 1.4 %
of the total balance sheet.
Profit and loss account
Analysis of the main headings of the profit
and loss accounts of banks and savings banks
showed that the trends in the two groups of in-
stitutions in the period analysed were very simi-
lar. There was a tendency for operating margins
(the gross margin and net interest margin) to
fall, which was offset by a relative decline in op-
erating costs and an improvement in the com-
ponents of the profit and loss account below net
income, as mentioned in the report. However,
there are certain notable differences between
the two groups owing to the different structure
of their business.
As can be seen in Chart A4, the margins of
savings banks are still higher than those of
banks, as a consequence of the greater weight
in their business of lending and deposit activi-
ty, in which margins are highest. Moreover, in
CHART A.2
Financing the gap between the flow of lending and the flow of deposits
   Source:  Banco de España.
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the case of savings banks, the margin ob-
tained in this activity is slightly higher than that
obtained by banks, probably because of the
higher weight in their loan portfolio of loans to
individuals which have higher margins than
loans to large firms. However, the savings
banks are losing this advantage in their mar-
gins. During the period analysed the savings
banks’ margins fell by more than those of the
banks: the savings banks’ net interest margin
fell by 70 basis points, their gross margin by
46 bp and their net margin by 21 bp, while the
banks’ fell by 46 bp, 38 bp and 13 bp, respec-
tively. Other factors that help to explain these
developments include the greater specialisa-
tion of the savings banks in lending and de-
posit activity, which saw the largest falls in op-
erating margins, a larger fall in the margin ob-
tained in the cash operations of the savings
banks and the smaller increase in their fees
and commissions.
These higher margins in the case of the sav-
ings banks in no way reflect a lack of competi-
tion or the existence of any kind of segmenta-
tion in the markets. As Chart A4 also shows,
when operating costs are taken into account,
banks and savings banks have much closer ra-
tios. The explanation for these results lies large-
ly in the differences in the structure of the busi-
ness of the two groups of institution which have
been mentioned above. The larger weight of re-
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CHART A.3
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tail activity in the business of the savings banks
means that the assets managed per employee
are lower than those of the banks where, given
the higher relative weight of wholesale activity,
the volume of assets managed per employee is
much greater. The corollary of this is that retail
activity has higher margins. Moreover, It should
not be forgotten that there is no legal limitation
on banks or savings banks preventing them
from concentrating on whichever segment
(wholesale or retail) they should wish to. Ac-
cordingly, in the present highly competitive en-
vironment, the productive specialisation men-
tioned on various occasions in this annex can-
not be attributed to the existence of segmenta-
tion in this market.
Indeed, although operating costs (as a per-
centage of the total balance sheet) have fallen
continuously both in banks and savings banks,
the reduction has been slightly greater in the
latter. The main item explaining this difference
is communication and data processing costs, so
that very possibly the ultimate reason is the
lower impact on savings banks of adaptation to
the euro and year-2000 compliance. This could
be explained by the fact that a significant part of
the adaptation has affected shared systems op-
erated by CECA (Spanish Confederation of
Savings Banks), which has helped to reduce
the costs involved.
It is interesting to note also that the trends in
employees and branches have also differed be-
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CHART A.4
Margins and operating costs
0
1
2
3
4
5
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999(III)
0
1
2
3
4
5
 NET INTEREST MARGIN
 GROSS MARGIN
 NET MARGIN
 PROFIT (LOSS) BEFORE TAX
SAVINGS BANKS: TOTAL
   Source:  Banco de España.
0
1
2
3
4
5
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999(III)
0
1
2
3
4
5
 NET INTEREST MARGIN
 GROSS MARGIN
 NET MARGIN
 PROFIT (LOSS) BEFORE TAX
COMMERCIAL BANKS: TOTAL
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999(III)
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
 AS % OF GROSS INCOME
 AS % OF AVERAGE TOTAL ASSETS (right-hand scale)
OPERATING COSTS
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999(III)
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
 AS % OF GROSS INCOME
 AS % OF AVERAGE TOTAL ASSETS (right-hand scale)
OPERATING COSTS
65BANCO DE ESPAÑA / ECONOMIC BULLETIN / JANUARY 2000
SPANISH FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INTERMEDIARIES
tween banks and saving banks. Although the
ratios of total assets to branches and to em-
ployees have grown similarly in banks and sav-
ings banks, there have been notable differ-
ences in the way it which these increases have
been achieved. In the case of savings banks
the increase has been achieved through an ex-
pansionary policy that has increased both the
number of branches and employees, while in
the case of the banks both these variables have
been reduced in absolute terms. As is to be ex-
pected given their productive specialisation dis-
cussed above, the banks still have higher ratios
than the savings banks.
